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[1551] 
An “Act of God”?  
Rethinking Contractual Impracticability in an 
Era of Anthropogenic Climate Change 
Myanna Dellinger* 
“Extreme” weather has become the new normal. Previously considered to be inexplicable 
and unpredictable “acts of God,” such weather can no longer reasonably be said to be so. 
They are acts of man. The current doctrine of contractual impracticability rests on the 
notion that a party may be exculpated from contractual liability if supervening events render 
a performance impracticable, unless they have implicitly or explicitly assumed the risk. To a 
large extent, courts still consider the foreseeability of the event and an a party’s ability to 
control it. However, it makes little logical or legal sense to continue to allow parties to escape 
liability for weather events that are in fact highly foreseeable given today’s knowledge about 
the causes and effects of severe weather. Some parties may even be found to have had some 
“control” of the development of the weather event and thus not be able to avoid liability. 
This Article proposes taking a new, hard look at the doctrine of impracticability and the 
closely related doctrine of frustration of purpose. By modernizing these doctrines to reflect 
current on-the-ground reality, the judiciary may further help instigate a broader awareness 
of the underlying problem and need for corrective action against climate change at both the 
private and governance scales. Meanwhile, a more equitable risk-sharing framework should 
be implemented where contracting parties have failed to reach a sufficiently detailed 
antecedent agreement on the issue. 
The law is never static. It must reflect real world phenomena. Climate change is a highly 
complex problem requiring attention and legal solutions for many problems including 
contractual performance liability. The general public is often said to have lost faith in the 
judiciary. Given this perception, courts could regain some of that faith in the context of 
events for which no “God,” other supernatural power, or even nature can be blamed. 
 
 * J.D. (Coif), M.A. Professor Dellinger is an Associate Professor of Law with the University of 
South Dakota School of Law where she teaches Public International Law, International Business 
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International Environmental Law section of the American Branch of the International Law Association. 
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Climate change is real and is already affecting humankind as well as 
our natural surroundings. The list of evidence is persuasive and almost 
never-ending. For example, over the last century, the global average 
temperature has increased by more than 1.3°F.1 Fifteen of the top sixteen 
warmest years on record have occurred since 2000.2 Unsurprisingly, 2015 
was the warmest year on record at 1.62˚F (0.90˚C) above the twentieth 
century average, more than twenty percent higher than the previous 
highest departure from average.3 Temperatures reached their highest 
levels in the history of modern records during the 2001–2010 time period 
and continue to rise at a rate that is unprecedented in the past 1,300 
 
 1. Climate Change Science Overview, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/ 
overview.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (stating that the average temperature in the Arctic rose by 
almost twice as much during the same period and will continue to warm more rapidly than the global 
mean); IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 
20 (2013), http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
 2. Brandon Miller, 2015 Is Warmest Year on Record, NOAA and NASA Say, CNN (Jan. 20, 2016, 5:55 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/20/us/noaa-2015-warmest-year/. 
 3. Id. 
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years.4 This situation will worsen unless drastic policy change is made at 
the global scale and implemented on the ground. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has found it “likely” that the global 
mean temperature by the end of the twenty-first century, compared to 
2005 levels, will increase by as much as 8.6°F (4.8°C) unless effective 
steps are taken to counter the temperature trend.5 
Climate change has been recognized to cause a wide range of 
problems such as heat-related human deaths and illnesses (physical and 
mental),6 rising seas, increased storm intensity and frequency, extreme 
and prolonged droughts and wildfires in some regions, as well as extreme 
cold spells and snowfall in others. Some currently colder regions on 
Earth may stand to benefit in a limited manner from warmer 
temperatures,7 but even that may be offset by problems with, for 
example, crop and other plant diseases the extent of which is not yet fully 
known. Add to this the risks of civil unrest, riots, mass migrations and 
perhaps wars caused by water and food shortages. It is no longer 
reasonably debatable that climate change will take a huge toll on human 
health and prosperity as well as pose significant risks to national security 
if it is not curbed. 
What causes climate change? Human activity: 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-
industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and 
are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at 
least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other 
anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate 
system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century.8 
 
 4. World Meteorological Org., The Global Climate 2001–2010: A Decade of Climate 
Extremes 1 (2013); Climate Change: How Do We Know?, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab, Cal. Inst. 
Tech., http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 5. IPCC, supra note 1.  
 6. In August 2013, for example, the journal Science reported that shifts in climate are strongly 
linked to human violence around the world, such as spikes in domestic violence in India and Australia, 
increased assaults and murders in the United States, ethnic violence in Europe, land invasions in Brazil, 
police violence in Holland, and civil conflicts throughout the tropics. Kathleen Maclay, Warmer Climate 
Strongly Affects Human Conflict and Violence Worldwide, Says Study, Berkeley News (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://news.berkeley.edu/2013/08/01/climate-strongly-affects-human-conflict-and-violence-worldwide-
says-study/. 
 7. This once famously caused Russian President Putin to point out that “an increase of two or three 
degrees wouldn't be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats, and the 
grain harvest would go up.” Fred Pearce, Global Warming ‘Will Hurt Russia,’ New Scientist (Oct. 3, 2003), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4232-global-warming-will-hurt-russia.html#.VN6HPikhPOE. 
 8. IPCC, supra note 1, at 1. 
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“Extremely likely” means to a 95–100% degree of certainty;9 these 
words of estimative probability are rarely used by the scientific 
community, further buttressing the strength of their findings. 
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further 
warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate 
system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible 
impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change will require 
substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that, 
together with adaptation, can limit the risks posed by climate change. No 
less than twenty-five years after the adoption of the United Nations 
Framework Conference on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, the global governance system only 
recently, with the Paris Agreement (“Agreement”), decided to limit the 
increase in the global average temperature to “well below” 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels, and to “pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” by 2100.10 Although widely 
lauded, for good reason, as a historical agreement following its adoption 
in December 2015, the Agreement is not the panacea that many had 
hoped for and that truly would have been in order given the significance 
of the problem. 
However, reason to remain skeptical towards the ultimate 
effectiveness of the Agreement exists. For example, the Agreement 
contains few legally binding provisions. The implementation horizon is 
long: the first “nationally determined contributions,” promises submitted 
by each nation about its planned individual action to reach the overall 
target will be reviewed for the first time in 2023 and every five years 
thereafter.11 The ultimate goal must be reached by 2100. Many 
thingsgood and bad bothcould happen in that long time horizon. 
Nations have committed to the “highest possible ambition,” but the 
agreement does not set numeric targets for action to be taken.12 Global 
peaking of greenhouse gas emissions should be reached “as soon as 
possible,” with “rapid reductions thereafter.”13 This wording sends a clear 
message to global society that the world’s remaining reserves of coal, oil, 
and gas must stay in the ground. In contrast to a previous version of the 
agreement, the adopted text does not, however, call for “reaching 
greenhouse gas emissions neutrality in the second half of the century,” a 
 
 9. Id. at 4, n.2. 
 10. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
 11. Id.  
 12. This, of course, would have made the agreement unacceptable to some nations such as the 
United States. Id.  
 13. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 10. 
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provision that oil producers fiercely resisted.14 Further, developed 
nations are expected to assist developing nations in reaching the goals, 
but no specific goal was agreed upon in this context. An aspirational $100 
billion-a-year-goal is included in the “decision” part of the document and 
not the “action” part to avoid triggering review in the United States.15 To 
be sure, the Agreement is better supranational climate treaty news than 
what nations have been able to produce over the past many years. 
However, time will tell whether this time around nations will live up to 
their promises. 
In one way, the Paris Agreement is not all that different from what 
nations originally promised to do via the 1992 Convention under which 
nations committed to “[stabilizing] greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system,”16 which has since been recognized 
to be the 1.5°/2°C temperature increase listed in the Agreement. Thus, 
although a numerical value has now been attached to what constitutes 
dangerous anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, the substance of the 
promise is still much the same as in 1992. This is troublesome, as the fact 
remains that since 1992, greenhouse gas emissions have not been 
sufficiently curbed at the global scale. In short, there is much reason to 
be optimistic about the new Agreement, but it is not a fail-proof 
instrument by any stretch of the imagination.17 Solutions may have to 
come from the purely national levels or from narrower national 
 
 14. Sewell Chan, The Road to a Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/key-points-of-the-final-paris-climate-draft. 
 15. Id. 
 16. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 10. 
 17. For example, on January 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court placed a temporary stay on the 
implementation of the federal Clean Power Plan, which was said to be the “biggest game in town” in 
terms of achieving the then only two-month-old Paris Agreement. Michael B. Gerrard, The Supreme 
Court Stay of the Clean Power Plan and the Paris Pledges, Columbia Law School: Climate Law Blog 
(Feb. 10, 2016) (last visited Aug. 5, 2016), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2016/02/10/the-
supreme-court-stay-of-the-clean-power-plan-and-the-paris-pledges/. The stay may be lifted only when all 
legal challenges to the Plan have been heard. Lyle Denniston, Carbon Pollution Controls Put on Hold, 
SCOTUSblog (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/carbon-pollution-controls-put-on-hold/. 
The division of the Court along ideological lines, with conservative justices all supporting the stay while 
the liberal justices opposed, is troublesome. And, “[i]f these divisions hold, the Clean Power Plan may 
suffer further setbacks in the Supreme Court which may ultimately render it useless.” Matt McGrath, 
Obama Climate Initiative: Supreme Court Calls Halt, BBC (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
science-environment-35538350 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). A host of other measures are needed to meet 
the United States goals under the new Paris Agreement. Gerrard, supra. Many have been set forth in the 
Second Biennial Report of the United States under the UNFCCC. U.S. Dept. of State, Second Biennial 
Report of the United States: Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (2016), https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_ 
reports/application/pdf/2016_second_biennial_report_of_the_united_states_.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016). But even all of those goals are not enough to meet the 2025 goals. Gerrard, supra.  
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constellations.18 The dangerous temperature increase trajectory on which 
we currently find ourselves will hopefully be altered for the better, but it 
is unfortunately far from a given that this will be the case. 
It already seems as if more parties are affected by natural disasters 
than ever before.19 One explanation may be as follows: 
More people are affected by natural disasters today because there are 
more people in the world to be affected. But beyond basic statistics, 
natural disasters may be getting more expensive because more people are 
building more expensive infrastructure in areas that are prone to natural 
disasters, like coastal areas, fire-prone forests, steep mountain slopes, and 
riverbanks. If disasters are having a greater impact today, . . . the culprit is 
not Mother Nature, it’s human nature.20 
With respect to hurricanes alone, some experts believe that 
increases in losses are “changes in society, not in climate fluctuations.”21 
Among such changes are increased population densities. For example, 
“more people lived in south Florida’s Miami-Dade and Broward counties 
in 1990 than in the entire 103 counties along the hurricane-prone 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Texas through Virginia in 1930.”22 Around 
the world, hundreds of millions of people live in disaster-prone areas.23 
The number of people affected by “disasters” has been growing by six 
percent each year since 1960.24 Seen from one point of view, natural 
“disasters” are disastrous simply because so many people choose to live 
and conduct business in harm’s way. 
However, that view does not bar closer scrutiny. The problem is 
simply not solely attributable to our choice of geographical location. 
Research clearly shows that “[t]he number of weather-related natural 
catastrophes in North America has risen from around 50 a year in the 
early 1980s to around 200 a year, at an annual cost of approximately $110 
billion in 2012.”25 The frequency and intensity of severe weather has 
worsened over recent decades. Weather is thus not just an environmental 
 
 18. See generally Myanna Dellinger, Localizing Climate Change Action, 14 Minn. J.L. Sci. & 
Tech. 603, 616, 651–67 (2013); Myanna Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate 
Change Regime Complex: The “Magic Number” is Three, 37 Fordham Int’l L.J. 373, 433–40 (2014), 
[hereinafter Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations]. 
 19. The “Nature” of the Problem: Population and Natural Disasters, NASA, http://earthobservatory. 
nasa.gov/Features/RisingCost/rising_cost2.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. David Ropeik, Putting the Disaster in Natural Disasters. Why Do We Live in Harm's Way?, 
BigThink, http://bigthink.com/risk-reason-and-reality/putting-the-disaster-in-natural-sisasters-why-do-
we-live-in-harms-way (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 24. Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Percentage of Population 
Living in Hazard Prone Areas, U.N., http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_ 
sheets/natural_hazards/population_hazard_proneareas.pdf. 
 25. Michael B. Gerrard & Shelley Welton, Symposium Commentary, US Federal Climate Change 
Law in Obama’s Second Term, 3 Transnat’l Envtl. L. 111, 122 (2014). 
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issueit’s a major economic factor as well. “At least $1 trillion of our 
economy is weather-sensitive.”26 The fourteen most extreme weather-
related events in 2011 cost the United States economy more than $55 
billion.27 A related problem is that today’s many high-tech goods and 
machinery are more susceptible to damage than functionally similar 
items of the past.28 This too adds to the financial risks of contracting. 
What does this mean for contract law? Climate change is already 
affecting and will continue to affect, at least for some time to come,  
myriad aspects of modern industrialized life, and thus contractual 
relations. Think, for example, of private and government transactions 
ranging from farming, power and water contracts to urban and rural 
planning projects, construction agreements, private and public 
transportation deals, the sale and delivery of goods, and health, home, 
and business insurance.29 Contracting parties may undertake obligations 
that it will become increasingly difficult or even impossible to perform on 
time or at all if failing to take the increased likelihood of extreme 
weather events into account at the contract negotiation stages. Realistic 
planning already mars the contract drafting and execution landscape 
when it comes to “extreme” weather. If history serves as an indicator of 
problems to arise in the future, parties may still have a difficult time 
incorporating new climate realities into their contracts for some time to 
come. 
Some sectorsin particular the insurance sectorare paying heed 
to the effects of climate change and extreme weather on their business 
performances. In other sectors, parties continue to conduct “business as 
usual.” The problem with this approach is that there is no “usual” 
anymore when it comes to assessing the risks associated with “extreme” 
weather events. If it were possible to accurately pinpoint which events 
would happen where and when, contract drafting would be much 
simpler. Contracts could then specifically address the risks rather than 
allocating the risks of unforeseen occurrences, as is currently often the 
case. However, doing so is at the same time both easier and more 
difficult. Easier because extreme weather events must now be expected 
to take place to a greater extent and degree of severity than before, and 
more difficult because the human imagination often still does notor 
cannotaccurately predict what could happen and where. For example, 
 
 26. Jeffery W. Meyers & Adam H. Sheinkin, The Ins and Outs of Fair “Weather Clauses” in 
Power Project Contracts, 27 Nat. Resources & Env’t 18 (2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. The “Nature” of the Problem: Population and Natural Disasters, supra note 19. 
 29. Although the insurance industry is significantly affected by, and concerned with, the on-the-
ground and potential future effects of extreme weather events, it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
go in depth with insurance contracts per se or the insurance industry in general. 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
1558 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1551 
earthquakes are now traced to our insatiable need for fossil fuels.30 
Oklahomahome of numerous fracking activitiessaw a fivefold surge 
in earthquakes in 2014 with twice as many earthquakes as California, 
although Oklahoma is only half the size of California.31 Additionally, the 
shifting of the weight of ice previously placed on the various parts of 
Earth’s crusts could change the stresses acting on earthquake faults and 
volcanoes and thus exacerbate already existing risks from this angle.32 In 
2014, a tornado pounded Los Angeles with high winds and heavy rain in 
December, although the Los Angeles area normally does not experience 
tornadoes.33 The intense 2003 and 2010 heat waves in Europe were 
blamed for more than 100,000 deaths,34 although deadly heat waves and 
extreme cyclones have been far from common in relatively temperate 
Europe. 
Business parties will benefit from carefully considering their 
contract drafting and performance obligations as they may be presented 
with a Sophie’s choice of sorts if weather poses a problem to their 
performances: if parties fail to draft the contract with sufficient accuracy 
in relation to the weather risks intended to be covered by the contract, 
courts may interpret the contract differently than if the parties had been 
more accurate. Conversely, if parties very narrowly describe their desired 
risk allocation, fewer arguments can be made that unspecified events that 
may well happen are covered by the agreement. 
At bottom, the problem is very much one of awareness and conscious 
risk consideration. A central cause of this problem is the human 
misunderstanding of, or inability to understand, risk and probability. For 
example: 
 
 30. See, e.g., How Oil and Gas Disposal Wells Can Cause Earthquakes, StateImpact, https:// 
stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/earthquake/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Anastasia Pantsios, Confirmed: 
Oklahoma Earthquakes Caused By Fracking, EcoWatch (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://www. 
ecowatch.com/confirmed-oklahoma-earthquakes-caused-by-fracking-1882034344.html (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016). 
 31. Mike Soraghan, Earthquakes: Shaken More than 580 Times, Okla. Is Top State for Quakes in 
2014, EnergyWire (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/ 1060011066 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 32. Andrea Thompson, Global Warming Might Spur Earthquakes and Volcanoes, LiveScience 
(Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.livescience.com/ 7366-global-warming-spur-earthquakes-volcanoes.html. 
 33. Melissa Pamer et al., Rare Tornado Pounds South Los Angeles Neighborhood with Damaging 
Winds, KTLA5, (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:23 PM), http://ktla.com/2014/12/12/tornado-strikes-south-l-a-
neighborhood-rips-roof-off-building-residents/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 34. Wynne Parry, Recent Heat Waves Likely Warmest Since 1500 in Europe, Science (Mar. 17, 
2011, 2:02 PM), http://www.livescience.com/ 13296-european-russia-heat-waves-climate-change.html 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
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The chance of the next “Big One” earthquake in southern 
Californiamagnitude 7 or greateris close to 100% sometime in the 
next 50 years, but it’s only two or three percent for any one of those 
years. Those low odds of risk in the shorter term, the time frame we 
care about the most, play right into some serious cognitive limitations 
that challenge our ability to make intelligent choices about risk.35 
Many scientific studies demonstrate the human inability or perhaps 
conscious reluctance to fully address future risks. This is especially so in 
relation to climate change and its myriad legal implications.36 As in other 
contexts, hope springs eternal in the contracting arena. 
At the same time, the judiciary continues to give weight to the 
established, but still highly viable, doctrine of impracticability and the 
closely related frustration of purpose doctrine. These may allow parties 
to escape contractual liability when extreme weather has made a 
contractual performance impracticable or frustrated the purpose of the 
contract. Relying on these doctrines to the same extent as before does 
not make much factual, legal, or socio-political sense any longer in light 
of the availability and increasing reliability of knowledge about the 
causes and effects of the increasing amount and severity of extreme 
weather events. 
In this Article, I argue that although established contract law 
principles typically dictate that parties are free to allocate contractual 
risks as they see fit, time has come for courts to take a harder look at the 
continued relevance and applicability of inaccurately drafted or 
inequitable contractual “force majeure” clauses intended to cover 
extreme weather events. Contractual risk prediction, assumption, and 
allocation considerations along with significant public policy reasons 
warrant rethinking the impracticability doctrine as it applies to weather 
events. While it would require much judicial courage to entirely set aside 
force majeure clauses in relation to weather events or, where no such 
clauses have been drafted, to disregard the applicable common law 
notions of impracticability and frustration of purpose, the judiciary is 
more likely to and indeed should limit the applications of these doctrines 
to events that can truly be classified as “extraordinary,” “unforeseen” 
and contractually unassumed given today’s readily available knowledge 
of weather patterns and climate change. Such a limitation is warranted 
for reasons of public policy. Further, the time may have come to evaluate 
 
 35. Ropeik, supra note 23. 
 36. See Janet Swim et al., Psychology & Global Climate Change: Addressing a Multi-Faceted 
Phenomenon and Set of Challenges, Am. Psychol. Ass’n Task Force on the Interface Between 
Phsycol. & Global Climate Change, https://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change.pdf; 
Tara Parker-Pope, Wrong About Risk? Blame Your Brain, N.Y. Times (Jan. 16, 2008), http://well.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2008/01/16/wrong-about-risk-blame-your-brain/?_r=1; Kharunya Paramaguru, The Battle over 
Global Warming Is All in Your Head, Science (Aug. 19, 2013), http://science.time.com/2013/08/19/in-denial-
about-the-climate-the-psychological-battle-over-global-warming/. 
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and allocate contractual risks from a comparative framework much like 
comparative negligence in torts instead of the currently applicable binary 
framework applied in contract law. 
A judicial reconsideration of impracticability may further encourage 
contractual partners and even broader segments of society to realize that 
climate change can and will affect virtually everyone in the future. 
Everyoneincluding business partners in contractual transactions that 
arguably do not directly affect climate change to any yet measurable 
extentshould be better prepared to face the practical, financial, and 
legal risks associated with extreme weather events to which we all 
contribute. The judiciary has a key role to play in this context. A 
modernized judicial view on impracticability and force majeure clauses in 
the extreme weather context has the potential to lead to a system of 
more accurate risk prediction and cost internalization by contracting 
parties. Rethinking impracticability in relation to weather events would 
also force a broader societal awareness of the consequences of climate 
change. These goals can be accomplished via established common law 
principles of contracts without violating the separation of powers and 
political question doctrines. 
This Article first gives a broad overview of the purpose and effects 
of the concept of “force majeure” and the impracticability doctrine in 
general. The Article proceeds to describe the classic legal 
“human/nature” separation in order to demonstrate how this has become 
a distinction without much practical difference when it comes to severe 
weather events and why the related law should develop accordingly. An 
in-depth deconstruction of the modern doctrine of contractual 
impracticability and force majeure in the United States follows. In this 
Part, I critique the doctrine and provide suggestions for change. 
Considerations include some of the many public policy considerations 
that play a role in the pressing problems caused by climate change. These 
must be addressed from numerous angles, including contract law, in 
order for society to become better prepared both legally and financially 
for our new weather reality. Several considerations warrant taking a 
much harder look at the impracticability doctrine than ever before in 
order to make the common law reflect current reality. 
This Article only analyzes the impracticability and frustration of 
purpose doctrines in light of weather-related events, and thus not events 
such as riots, wars, and economic and political problems, on the basis of 
which parties may otherwise also seek contractual exculpation. 
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I.  Purposes of Contractual Impracticability 
Contract liability is, in general, no-fault liability.37 Thus, “[e]ven if 
performance is impossible or senseless, the assessment of damages for 
non-performance remains a possibility.”38 Risk allocation is key. Under 
the freedom of contract principle, parties are free to allocate the practical 
and financial risks of unforeseen circumstances as they wish. In the early 
common law, contracting parties had to perform their promises no 
matter what. However, notions of consent, mutual mistake, and fairness 
led courts to find that when a situation had arisen under which the 
performance at issue was simply not contemplated, it would be unfair to 
hold a party to an otherwise clearly promised contractual performance.39 
Equity was thus the underlying rationale for creating a limited excuse for 
delayed performances or non-performances despite the contracting 
parties’ promises to be mutually bound. The excuse sprang from 
situations in which it was literally impossible to perform under the 
particular contract. However, as it is rarely truly “impossible” to 
complete a promised performancea party can, for example, often cover 
with goods from another supplier or employ more assistance to perform 
a service although doing so may be more expensive than originally 
contemplatedthe modern doctrine is known as “impracticability.” This 
denotes a situation where a performance is so cumbersome and 
expensive to carry out that it would be unreasonable to enforce the 
promised performance.40 
If a party’s total performance or delayed performance is excused, 
the party will not be liable for breach of contract.41 Yet, the constructive 
condition to the other party’s performance is, in that case, also not 
fulfilled. Thus, the other party’s duty to perform its return duty is 
typically also excused under the common law.42 As is most often the case, 
however, the matter depends on any explicit contractual risk allocation 
in the form of “act of God” or force majeure clauses. For example, where 
a boat slip renter entered into a contract that only excused the slip 
owner’s performance in situations of “inclement weather or any other 
circumstances beyond its control,” the renter still had to pay rent for the 
time period during which the boat slip was unavailable due to a flood.43 
Parties frequently use similar clauses to allocate the risk of certain events 
hindering their performances. Barring such clauses, American courts 
 
 37. Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts, § 13.20 (6th ed. 2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1325 (One Volume ed. 1952). 
 41. John Edward Murray Jr., Murray on Contracts § 116 (5th Ed. 2011); Perillo, supra note 
37, § 13.23. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Entzel v. Moritz Sport & Marine, 841 N.W.2d 774, 777, 779 (N.D. 2014). 
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have generally taken the view that when a contract is discharged by 
impracticability under the elements analyzed below, the parties must 
make restitution for whatever benefits they may have received from the 
other party under the contract, although they are excused from any 
possible remaining performance.44 Alternatively, courts may gap-fill with 
a term that is “reasonable in the circumstances.”45 
The closely related doctrine of frustration of purpose applies where 
the main purpose of a contract has become “frustrated or destroyed.”46 A 
party may, in that case, seek to avoid its return obligation.47 Thus, the 
doctrine of impracticability is asserted to avoid liability for a delayed or 
entirely missing contractual performance, whereas frustration of purpose 
applies in situations where a party is seeking an excuse for having to pay 
for a promised performance that has become virtually worthless to that 
party. In other words, impracticability is typically invoked by suppliers of 
goods and services, whereas frustration of purpose is invoked by buyers.48 
The same basic requirements apply to frustration and impracticability.49 
Frustration of purpose may be invoked under both the Restatement 
(Second)50 and the UCC. Although the UCC contains no explicit provision 
for frustration of purpose, the UCC intends that the common law doctrine 
also applies under the Code.51 Further,  
Because the rules . . . might otherwise appear to have the harsh effect of 
denying either party any recovery following the discharge of one party’s 
duty based on impracticability or frustration, . . . several mitigating 
doctrines may be used to allow at least some recovery in a proper case.52  
 
 44. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.23. 
 45. Id. As explained by Corbin: “If the contract contains no words of express condition to either 
party's duty of performance, the court may have to fill the gap and determine whether the continued 
availability of certain means of performance should be deemed a constructive or implied condition.” 
14 Corbin on Contracts § 75.7 (Perillo rev. 2001). 
 46. See, e.g., JB Pool Mgmt., LLC v. Four Seasons at Smithville Homeowners Ass’n, 67 A.3d 702 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Phillips P.R. Core, Inc. v. Tradax Petroleum, Ltd., 782 F.2d 314, 319 
(2d Cir. 1985); see also United Equities Co. v. First Nat’l City Bank, 52 A.D.2d 154, 161 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1976). 
 47. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.12. 
 48. The modern impossibility/impracticability doctrine is well known from cases such as 
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (plaintiff ship operator not 
entitled to additional payment because of closing of Suez Canal due to political unrest in region), 
whereas the frustration of purpose doctrine is most well known from the seminal case of Krell v. 
Henry, (1903) KB 740, 754 (Eng.) (renter excused from paying two-day rent to view the coronation 
procession of King Edward VII, who fell ill and whose coronation was thus postponed). 
 49. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.12. 
 50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 51. Alternatively, but outside the scope of this Article, a party may seek to be excused from an 
express condition if the condition would result in “extreme forfeiture” and the condition is not a “material 
part” of the agreed exchange. Id. §§ 11.35, 13.10; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 271 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1981); Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.12.  
 52. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 272 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
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 These include the rule on part performances as agreed equivalents, 
restitution, and supplying a term to avoid injustice.53 
A question that arises in this context is whether and how such risks 
affect contract law. As a starting point, parties are free to allocate their 
risks as they wish under the principle of freedom of contract. Contracting 
parties are often presumed by courts to be sufficiently sophisticated and 
rational to address this area of concern in the contract formation process. 
Further, courts typically also consider whether parties are “represented 
by counsel who [were] at liberty to define the nature of force majeure in 
whatever manner they desire.”54 But is this truly the case in general? 
And, what are the risks to not only the contracting parties, but also to 
society if these assumptions do not match reality? 
Often, force majeure clauses are only an afterthought and are 
precisely not the subject of meaningful or extensive negotiations.55 
Sometimes parties find themselves too busy to draft solid, tailored force 
majeure clauses. At other times, parties either do not want to address the 
realities, cannot reach an agreement on what to do if certain events 
should arise, or simply fail to realistically foresee problematic events. 
Frequently used boilerplate clauses such as “act of God” and force 
majeure clauses may turn out not to be sufficiently clear or tailored to 
offer adequate protection for a party. Some parties simply do not have 
the sophistication, experience, and resources that other parties do. That 
is arguably the very nature of contract law. That, of course, does not 
entitle one party to take opportunistic advantage of another party’s 
ignorance. Even when the matter may not rise to the level of one party 
taking outright advantage of another, the risk remains that one party 
may enjoy a much stronger bargaining position than the other, which can 
lead to the execution of contractual stipulations that are not as “freely” 
negotiated as some courts may presume. With the concentration of 
business power in a seemingly growing number of larger and larger 
corporations, this concern is relevant when it comes to contractual 
allocations of weather-related risk, as will be analyzed below. 
If a case goes to trial, triers of fact may also not be sufficiently 
rational or sophisticated to reach the result to which a given party may 
consider itself entitled under existing law. This could be quite costly. 
Where parties may not have been able to reach an agreement on the 
issue at all, or have not clearly allocated their risks in relation to weather, 
a risk allocation scheme that is more modern and fair than what is 
arguably the case today should be considered by courts. 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 55. Meyers & Sheinkin, supra note 26, at 1. 
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A question in this context is thus, whether it matters who pays for 
the financial effects of non-performances or delayed contract 
performances. This matters greatly to parties who thought that they 
would be able to escape a contract performance given certain events as 
well as to the opposing party who is relying on the performance. If, as 
happens, a party is held liable for the consequences of nonperformance 
contrary to that party’s expectations, the situation could turn out to be 
very dire for that party in light of the increasing severity of some weather 
eventsrecall Hurricane Sandy. Often, insurance or other types of 
financial protections could be procured ahead of time, but parties may 
neglect to do so. The insurance industry is well aware of the financial 
risks posed to it by climate change and is already limiting coverage in 
some contexts or greatly increasing premiums.56 Insurance may simply 
not be available for certain types of contracts or in some geographical 
areas to the same extent as it has been before, thus making it more 
necessary to consider the risks of extreme events to a contractual 
performance more carefully than ever before. 
This problem is not a new one. Natural disasters and the problem of 
extreme weather have long raised legal issues in contract law. However, 
the issue has become much more pressing than before because of our 
rapidly changing climate. Climate change is causing a tipping point in 
relation to not only our natural environment, but also in relation to the 
contractual excuse doctrines. Legal change is needed to match the new 
on-the-ground realities and scientific understanding of risks posed by 
weather. 
Finally, a “moral hazard” problem exists: even though both parties 
to a contract may understand the risks involved, a contract may allow 
only one of the partiesarguably the one with the stronger bargaining 
powerto reap the benefits of a force majeure clause. This may not be 
equitable under the circumstances and bears judicial scrutiny. 
In short, the doctrine of impracticability of performance has 
functioned well for quite some time, but a shift in public consciousness is 
taking place in relation to climate change. Time has come for contracting 
parties and legal practitioners to more carefully consider the legal risks 
 
 56. After Hurricane Sandy, for example, the annual insurance premium for a resident of Queens, New 
York, was predicted to jump from $458 to $15,000. Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for 
Substantially Higher Flood Insurance Rates, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
07/29/nyregion/overhaul-and-a-hurricane-have-flood-insurance-rates-set-for-huge-increases.html?_r= 0 (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). In January 2016, FEMA proposed a rule to establish a disaster deductible, requiring a 
predetermined level of financial or other commitment from grantees (generally state, tribal, or territorial 
governments) before FEMA will provide assistance. This rule “would incentivize Recipients to make 
meaningful improvements in disaster planning, fiscal capacity for disaster response and recovery, and risk 
mitigation . . . .” Establishing a Deductible for FEMA’s Public Assistance Program, Fed. Reg. (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/01/20/2016-00997/establishing-a-deductible-for-femas-public-
assistance-program (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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posed by climate change. Time has also come for the judiciary to take a 
hard look at the doctrine of impracticability as well as individual force 
majeure clauses to ensure that the law matches modern scientific 
knowledge about climate change as well as the public policy implications 
of judicial holdings in this context. The law always develops over time. It 
should in this context as well. 
II.  History of “Acts of God” and the Impracticability Doctrine 
In English-language common law, the notion that “acts of God” 
could provide a defense to liability first appeared in 1581 in the famous 
English “Shelley’s Case.”57 There, the perceived act of God was the death 
of one of the parties.58 The court stated: “[I]t would be unreasonable that 
those things which are inevitable by the Act of God, which no industry 
can avoid, nor policy prevent, should be construed to the prejudice of 
any person in whom there was no laches.”59 The phrase reappeared in the 
1702 case Coggs v. Bernard, which analyzed liability for a bailment by a 
common carrier.60 In this, Justice Holmes noted that “[t]he law charges 
this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against all events but acts of 
God, and of the enemies of the King.”61 
The concept quickly took hold in the common law, although the 
early cases did not specify what constituted an “act of God.” One attempt 
to do so was, however, made in 1875 by Lord Mansfield in Forward v. 
Pittard as follows: 
Now what is the act of God? I consider it to mean something in opposition 
to the act of man . . . the law presumes against the carrier, unless he shows 
it was done by the King’s enemies or by such act as could not happen by 
the intervention of man, as storms, lightning and tempests.62 
The notion of acts of God evolved in tort law from the early almost 
literal construct to mean something beyond human agency and control, 
such as windstorms, lightning, accidental fires, floods, and heavy rain. 
For example, in a case involving the failure of a reservoir after a violent 
thunderstorm with rainfall “greater and more violent than any within the 
memory of the witnesses,”63 the appellate court found that the resulting 
destruction of three bridges downriver was an act of God and thus not 
the result of negligence in either failing to predict the storm or in 
ensuring the safety of the embankments and weirs under ordinary, 
foreseeable conditions. 
 
 57. Shelly’s Case (1579–81) 76 Eng. Rep. 199.  
 58. Id. at 220.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Forward v. Pitard (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 953, 956. 
 63. Nichols v. Md. [1875] QB 255, 256 (Eng.). 
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In contrast, other early tort cases held that although rainfall was 
“heavy,” “extraordinary,” and “unprecedented,” it was not a supervening 
act of God.64 For example, 
[F]loods of extraordinary violence must be anticipated as likely to take 
place from time to time. It is the duty of any one who interferes with 
the course of a stream to see that the works which he substitutes for 
the channel provided by nature are adequate to carry off the water 
brought down even by extraordinary rainfall, and if damage results 
from the deficiency of the substitute which he has provided for the 
natural channel he will be liable. Such damage is not in the nature of 
damnum fatale, but is the direct result of the obstruction of a natural 
watercourse by the defenders’ works followed by heavy rain.65 
Fault thus played, and still plays, a major role in relation to the 
doctrine in tort and also bears some relevance to the overlapping concept 
in modern contract law. 
A survey of more recent English tort cases found a remaining 
reluctance on the part of the courts to “formulate any clear, rule-defined, 
theory of what is to be accounted an act of God in law.”66 However, “the 
involvement of man in anticipating and averting the danger”67 was and, to 
some extent still is, critical. In other words, the alleged incident must be 
due to direct and exclusive natural causes so that the incident “could not 
have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and care 
reasonably to be expected” from a party.68 
American cases adopted 200 years of English jurisprudence.69 An 
1868 California contract case borrowed from tort law and laid out the 
governing principle of what constituted an “act of God” in contract law: 
“The expression excludes the idea of human agency, and if it appears 
that a given loss has happened in any way through the intervention of 
man, it cannot be held to have been the act of God, but must be regarded 
as the act of man.”70 Even then, experts discussed whether a potential 
“act of the elements” was distinguishable from and potentially more 
comprehensive than a mere “act of God.”71 In at least one case, however, 
the court found that there was no difference between the two phrases 
and that the same test was to be applied.72 Today, the notion has, of 
course, developed, and should continue to, as will be analyzed below. 
 
 64. Greenock Corp. v. Caledonian Ry. Co. [1917] HL 556, 580 (Eng.). 
 65. Id. at 572. 
 66. C.G. Hall, An Unsearchable Providence: The Lawyer’s Concept of Act of God, 13 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 227, 238 (1993). 
 67. Id. at 241. 
 68. Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P.D. 423, 444 (1876). 
 69. Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort 
Law, 15 Rev. Litig. 1, 13 (1996). 
 70. Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416, 423 (1868). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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The notion that climatic events like storms, traditionally considered 
to be beyond the control of humans, could shield a defendant from 
liability for damages worked its way beyond contracts and tort law into 
admiralty and federal environmental law. For example, at least three 
federal acts allow for an “act of God” defense, namely the Clean Water 
Act,73 the Oil Pollution Act,74 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.75 These acts impose strict 
liability on parties responsible for oil spills, releases, or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances. However, parties may avoid liability if 
they can “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release 
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting 
therefrom were caused solely by an act of God.”76 The United States 
Congress defines an “act of God” as “[a]n unanticipated grave natural 
disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented 
or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.”77 In contrast to tort 
and contract law, the “act of God” defense has so far not succeeded 
under American statutory environmental law. Litigants have simply not 
been able to prove by the required preponderance of the evidence that 
the environmental damageoften toxic releaseswas caused solely by 
an unforeseen act which could not have been prevented by humans.78 For 
now, the concept is thus practically inapplicable in American 
environmental case law, although it officially remains alive in the 
statutes. 
Internationally, the concept is known as force majeure, which is “a 
general principle of law. It has been recognized throughout the history 
and geography of the legal systems of the world.”79 It operates as an 
affirmative defense to not only private liability, but also nation state 
liability for the consequences of supervening irresistible or unforeseen 
events.80 Recall that for purposes of this Article, only climatic events such 
as hurricanes, heavy rain, windstorms, blizzardss and floods will be 
analyzed to find out the extent to which these may relieve a contractual 
party of liability. 
 
 73. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (West 2016). 
 74. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703 (a)(1)–(4) (West 2004). 
 75. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)–(3) (West 2016). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (West 2016). 
 77. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (West 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (West 2016). 
 78. Myanna F. Dellinger, Rethinking “Fuerza Mayor” in a World of Anthropogenic Climate 
Change, 42 Derecho & Sociedad 45, J.L. of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, No. 42, 50–51 
(2014). 
 79. Federica I. Paddeu, A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International Law, 82 British 
Yearbook of Int’l L. 381, 384 (2011). 
 80. Id. at 383–84. 
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From where does the notion that some acts are caused by “God” or 
“nature” and others by “man” stem? I will briefly examine this issue next 
in order to demonstrate that excuses based on “acts of God” or 
impracticability are becoming less factually and legally supportable as 
knowledge about weather related events and climate change is 
developing. 
III.  Classic “Human/Nature” Separation 
Traditionally, “nature” has been seen as separated from “man”as 
two different ends of a spectrum of the world we inhibit. In spite of 
Darwin’s models of evolution, we still distinguish between what is “man-
made” and what is “natural” in many contexts. We think we “react” 
toor adapt tonatural events rather than “create” them. Culturally, 
this division has been so strong that nature has consistently been 
idealized as something “untainted” by humans.81 This continues to this 
day, and has become a selling point for many businesses, for example, in 
the hospitality, food, and real estate sectors. 
For example, some foods are marketed as “natural” or “organic,” 
indicating a lack of human intervention, implying they are somehow 
healthier than what people could create. In the context of recent 
American food and drug law developments, the “human vs. nature” 
dichotomy is relevant to product labeling using terms such as “organic,” 
“natural,” or “unprocessed.” But does it make sense to label products 
accordingly? After all, all foods require some forms of human 
participation from picking and shipping, roasting and freezing, to dyeing, 
waxing, and even genetically altering the raw ingredients.82 Separation of 
the “human” and the “natural” is increasingly being recognized as more 
of a continuum than a sharp division.83 
We also tend to think of ourselves as superior to both nature and 
animals. This too is a viewpoint that is becoming archaic and that is 
challenged to an increasing, although still somewhat controversial, 
extent. Our thoughts about what “nature” is and is not generate 
consequences for humankind and for our environment. Nonetheless, 
even though critiques of the human/nature dichotomy have been 
accepted by some as logical, even deeper and more difficult questions 
remain. For example, if “human” and “nature” are not separate, discrete 
categories, how can we accurately understand the concepts and their 
overlap, connection, or integration?84 We have to consider these aspects 
 
 81. Jill M. Fraley, Re-examining Acts of God, 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 669, 676 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 682. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 679. 
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as we develop our physical and metaphysical surroundings, including the 
common and statutory law. 
In turn, law is itself a human construct, often supporting and further 
developing the ideal of “nature” through legal texts, statutes, and court 
decisions. In the United States, the law has reinforced the idea that 
wilderness excludes humans.85 For example, the Wilderness Act of 1964 
defines wilderness regions as being “in contrast with those areas where 
man and his own works dominate the landscape.” The Wilderness Act 
defined the purpose of wilderness not in terms of any inherent value, but 
in terms of its value as a “resource” for human use, enjoyment, and 
consumption.86 The Wilderness Act outlawed development, permanent 
settlement, and road construction. As this demonstrates, the law 
produces culture, but simultaneously, the law is also reproductive and 
referential and incorporates widely accepted cultural notions and 
scientific conclusions.87 
Public land use law in the United States is also marked by a 
significant debate about what is “natural” and what is “human.”88 
Traditionally, the definition of “wilderness” in federal law has 
incorporated a sharp separation of human and natural activities; 
wilderness is a place “untrammeled by man.”89  
The plain meaning of “natural” may be seen to raise as many 
questions as it answers. “In particular, it fails to indicate the line between 
something forming by nature and something being artificially madethe 
line between humans acting within nature and acting outside or upon 
nature.”90 In many ways, trying to separate the anthropogenic from the 
natural has led to a “muddled jurisprudence.”91 At least in contract law, 
the demarcation between the concepts is proving to be without 
significance because of the recognized impact of mankind on climate 
change. 
The gist of the matter is that many, if not most, events of both a 
large and small magnitude that are important to us today have origins in 
human action or inaction. We are simply not separate from nature; we 
are an integral physiological part of it. Just as nature has an effect on us, 
so do we have a clear effect on it. We are unique, but not so unique as to 
continue seeing us as more or less entirely removed from our natural 
surroundings apart from when we seek to “visit” it for work or pleasure. 
 
 85. Id. at 681. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Sean Kammer, Coming to Terms with Wilderness: The Wilderness Act and the 
Problem of Wildlife Restoration, 43 Envtl. L. 83, 109 (2013). 
 89. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (West 2016). 
 90. Kammer, supra, note 88, at 109.  
 91. Id. at 123. 
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Humans do not operate in a factually implausible vacuum, separated 
from “nature” and “animals.”92 Because we have a demonstrable effect 
on nature and vice versa, we need to consider how we, with our modern 
understanding of our surroundings, should continue to apply legal 
doctrines, such as impracticability, that traditionally relied on a then-
supportable differentiation between “man” and “nature,” that is 
arguably no longer in existence. We must take the implications of the 
relationship between human identity and nature seriously.93 “We,” of 
course, also include the legal profession including legal practitioners and 
the judiciary. 
Changes in our perception of the law and in judicial applications of 
the law occur over time as our understanding of our natural surroundings 
improves. For example, where underground water flows were once also 
seen as almost “mysterious” and inexplicable phenomena, science has 
now documented how and where water flows. Water law changed with 
this understanding. Similarly, our understanding of weather patterns and 
climate change has changed drastically over recent years. The law should 
reflect current understanding of the impacts of climate change and what 
has so far been seen as “extreme” weather events. 
Nowhere is the connectivity between human activities and nature 
more pressing today than when it comes to the anthropocentricity of 
climate change. The potential implications on private law are clear. 
Below, the Article analyzes how contractual impracticability can and 
should be modernized in this context. 
IV.  Impracticability and Force Majeure in Modern Contract Law 
Turning to the modern doctrinal aspects of the impracticability and 
frustration doctrines in United States law, I will analyze several aspects 
ripe for reconsideration by the judiciary and more careful contract 
negotiation and drafting by practitioners. 
A. Definitions and Other Threshold Matters 
Courts and the general literature often use the phrases “force 
majeure” and “act of God” interchangeably in relation to an attempted 
and contractually agreed-upon excuse for having to perform under a 
 
 92. Even Pope Francis has weighed in on this debate. For example, in his September 25, 2015, 
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Pope stated that “[m]an, for all his remarkable gifts, 
which are signs of a uniqueness which transcends the spheres of physics and biology . . . is at the same 
time a part of these spheres. He possesses a body shaped by physical, chemical and biological elements, 
and can only survive and develop if the ecological environment is favorable. Any harm done to the 
environment, therefore, is harm done to humanity.” Pope Francis, Address at U.N. General Assembly 
(Sept. 25, 2015).  
 93. Fraley, supra note 81, at 680. 
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contract given events that have made the performance impracticable, or 
where the purpose of the contract has been frustrated. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “[a]ct of God” as “[a]n 
overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of 
nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado.”94 In tort, an “act of 
God” is “an operation of natural forces so unexpected that no human 
foresight or skill could reasonably be expected to anticipate it.”95 
In contract law, a leading treatise points out that “[t]he kinds of 
impossibility that [may excuse a performance] in many instances are 
caused by human beings, although the court might still refer to the event 
as an ‘act of God.’”96 “Acts of God” refer to natural disasters such as 
storms, droughts, floods, heavy rains, snowstorms, and earthquakes. In 
the English common law, the term “is limited to natural events.”97 
The term “force majeure” similarly denotes “[a]n event or effect 
that can be neither anticipated nor controlled, especially an unexpected 
event that prevents someone from doing or completing something that 
he or she had agreed or officially planned to do.”98 “Generally speaking, 
the term ‘force majeure’ refers to an event such as an ‘Act of God,’ 
beyond the parties’ reasonable control that intervenes to create a 
contractual impossibility and thereby excuses contract performance.”99 
Often, the two phrases are used synonymously, but the term “force 
majeure” includes both acts of God and acts of people such as riots, 
strikes, civil unrest, and wars.100 
Although clauses expressly allocating contractual risks are known as 
“force majeure” clauses, courts in English-speaking countries typically 
refer to the underlying events as “acts of God.” The Restatement 
(Second) also uses the phrase “act of God” for the impracticability 
defense.101 In non-English speaking countries, the term “force majeure” 
is used.102 It should be noted that in today’s increasingly secular world, 
some doubt has been cast on the desirability of the use of a legal phrase 
 
 94. Act of God, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 95. P.H. Winfield, A Textbook of the Law of Tort § 16 (5th ed. 1950). See R.F.V. Heuston, 
Salmond on the Law of Torts 330 (17th ed. 1977) (“If an act could not have been prevented by 
reasonable care, it is an act of God.”). 
 96. Corbin, supra note 40, § 74.4. 
 97. Paddeu, supra note 79, at 389. 
 98. Force Majeure, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 99. Id.; see Payne v. Hurwitz, 978 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“Force majeure is defined 
as ‘an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.’ It includes such acts of nature as 
floods and hurricanes.  It is essentially synonymous with the common law concept of ‘act of God’ . . . .” 
(citations omitted)).  
 100. See, e.g., Va.a Power Energy Mktg. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d 397, 400 n.3 (Tex. App. 
2009); Force Majeure, supra note 97. 
 101. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 102. The Latin phrase “vis major” is preferred by some. 
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in English that relies on the existence of a God.103 For these reasons, and 
because this Article proceeds from a secular point of view, the phrases 
“force majeure” or “impracticability” will be used, when possible, 
throughout this Article. 
Parties often allocate the risk of the occurrence of potentially 
problematic events expressly in their contracts in the form of force 
majeure clauses. These are “contractual provision[s] allocating the risk of 
loss if performance becomes impossible or impracticable, esp. as a result 
of an event or effect that the parties could not have anticipated or 
controlled.”104 Force majeure clauses “provide a means by which the 
parties may anticipate in advance a condition that will make performance 
impracticable. Such a clause conditions a party’s duty to perform upon 
the non-occurrence of some event beyond its control and serious enough 
to interfere materially with performance.”105 A leading treatise explains 
the importance of force majeure clauses in modern contract law as 
follows: 
Because most courts have held that failure to cover a foreseeable risk 
in the contract deprives a party of the defense of impossibility, the best 
way to protect a party’s interests is to address the risk of supervening 
events expressly in the agreement. Such a clause can take many forms 
and serve many purposes. It may be a force majeure clause discharging 
the party, an excusable-delay clause giving the party additional time to 
complete performance, a termination clause granting the party the 
right to terminate if certain events transpire, or a flexible-pricing clause 
allowing it to pass on increased costs to the other party.106 
Today, the scope and application of the “act of God” concept is thus 
governed “more by the terms of the contract than by common law 
theory.”107 However, even if a contract does not expressly provide that a 
party will be relieved of the duty to perform if a condition arises that 
makes performance impracticable, some courts may still relieve the party 
of that duty. Other courts, as mentioned, find that the impracticability 
 
 103. Bowman v. Columbia Tel. Co., 179 A.2d 197, 206 (1962); See Goldberg v. R. Grier Miller & 
Sons, Inc., 182 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1962). For both people of religion and otherwise, Pope Francis’ Recent 
Encyclical Letter on “Care for Our Common Home” discusses environmental issues including climate 
change law and governance issues from a Christian point of view. See generally Pope Francis, 
Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si' (May 24, 2015), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals 
/documents/papa-francesco_ 20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html. 
 104. Force Majeure, supra note 97. 
 105. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see M.J. Paquet, 
Inc. v. N.J. DOT, 749 A2.d 141, 152–53, (N. J. 2002); Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007). 
 106. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Delta Star, Inc., No. 06-CV-6155-CJS-MWP, 2009 WL 
368508, at *6 (W.D.N.Y Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting Corbin on Contracts § 74.19); see Perillo, supra 
note 37, § 13.19. 
 107. Tejas Power Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 14-98-00346-CV, 1999 WL 605550, at *4 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 12, 1999). 
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defense will not be available if the parties have not addressed the issue 
expressly in a contractual force majeure clause.108 
B. Examples of Force Majeure Clauses 
Express risk allocation can be accomplished via force majeure 
clauses. Very often, “extreme” or “unforeseen” weather events (“acts of 
God”) trigger an attempt to seek exculpation from contractual 
performance liability. Exactly what is meant by such events may differ 
based on the type and wording of the agreement at issue. Precise risk 
description thus becomes highly important if a party seeks exculpation 
from a promised contractual performance. 
The types of clauses used vary depending on the industry in which 
the parties operate. In the construction industry, for example, weather-
related events and other “acts of God” often allow for extensions of 
time, but typically not for money damages.109 In financing agreements or 
in merger and acquisition contracts, extreme weather events occurring 
between the signing and closing may provide a buyer, seller, or financing 
party with an opportunity to terminate the proposed transaction or claim 
breach for which monetary damages may be due.110 Insurance coverage 
may, incidentally, often mitigate monetary issues caused by weather-
related problems, but even where insurance is available, the key remains 
acute risk awareness and precise contract and insurance policy 
negotiation and drafting. 
Clauses addressing force majeure typically do so by way of 
exhaustive lists, carefully tailored limits, or negative inferences. A typical 
force majeure clause in the form of an “exhaustive list” looks like this: 
 
 108. See, e.g., Miller v. Durham, No. 07–14–00087–CV, 2014 WL 4101762, at *10 (Tex. App. Aug. 
19, 2014) (“Ultimately, the question of whether the drought forced the removal of the cattle from the 
leased premises is not before the Court because the record is clear about one aspect: the contract at 
issue did not contain an act of God or force majeure clause. Therefore, the drought would not be an 
excuse for performance of the contract.”); Miller v. Parker McCurley Props., L.L.C., 36 So. 3d 1234, 
1240 (Miss. 2010) (“We find the common law rule, on this subject, stated in the following manner: 
‘[w]here the law casts a duty on a party, the performance shall be excused, if it be rendered impossible 
by the act of God. But where a party, by his own contract, engages to do an act, it is deemed to be his 
own fault and folly, that he did not thereby expressly provide against contingencies, and exempt himself 
from liability in certain events; and in such case, therefore, that is, in the instance of an absolute and 
general contract, the performance is not excused by an inevitable accident or other contingency, 
although not foreseen by, or within the control of the party.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Hendrick v. 
Green, 618 So. 2d 76, 78 (Miss. 1993)). 
 109. Meyers & Sheinkin, supra note 26, at 18. 
 110. Id. 
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Force Majeure Event . . . means any act, event or circumstance . . . which 
prevents, hinders or delays the affected Party in its performance of all (or 
part) of its obligations under this Contract . . . without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, a Force Majeure Event may include any of the 
following . . . an Act of God, including drought, fire, earthquake, tsunami, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, flood, hurricane, lighting strike, cyclone, 
tornado, typhoon or other natural disasters or . . . any act, event or 
circumstance of a nature analogous to any of the foregoing.111 
In other instances, parties do not seek to explain what is meant by 
an “act of God” at all. This could be problematic. An example is as 
follows: 
In the event [either of the parties] shall be delayed or hindered or 
prevented from the performance of any obligation required under this 
Agreement by reason of strikes[,] lockouts, inability to procure labor 
or materials, failure of power, fire or other casualty, acts of God, 
restrictive governmental laws or regulations, riots, insurrection, war or 
any other reason not within the reasonable control of [the parties], 
then the performance of such obligation shall be excused for the period 
of such delay . . . .112 
Yet other contracts make no use of either the phrase “act of God” 
or “force majeure” at all, but simply state a list of events that qualify, 
often concluded with a phrase such as “or as the result of any cause 
whatsoever beyond the control of [one of the parties].”113 
Contracts that feature carefully tailored limits typically attempt to 
evaluate and quantify the expected weather for a given region and then 
define “extreme” or “unforeseen” weather as any event that falls outside 
a pre-determined measure above or below the norm.114 
An example of a clause that makes use of a negative inference may, 
for example, state that “the following shall not constitute Force Majeure 
Events . . . delays resulting from weather conditions that could reasonably 
be expected to occur in the geographic region in which the Project is 
located.”115 
Finally, in some industries such as construction and power 
generation, “prudent industry practices” include standards that may be 
implicated by extreme weather events. These should thus be considered 
carefully not only at the contract negotiation and drafting stages, but 
should also be revisited throughout the life of the agreement as well to 
ensure compliance.116 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. App. 2013) (second 
alteration in original). 
 113. See, e.g., Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 114. Meyers & Sheinkin, supra note 26, at 18. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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C. Elements 
When conducting research for this Article, I analyzed approximately 
100 contract law cases addressing weather-related events after Hurricane 
Katrina (2005). I set my parameters accordingly to examine whether and 
how the modern-day applications of the established doctrines of 
impracticability and frustration of purpose, through either force majeure 
clauses or in the form of stand-alone common law doctrine, have 
changed. Seeing how courts currently apply the law may help 
practitioners avoid the legal pitfalls they may otherwise encounter given 
the increasing frequency and severity of weather events. The analysis 
may also assist the judiciary in realizing ways in which the doctrine could 
and arguably should be modernized in the context of weather-related 
contractual performance problems. I present my recommendations in 
order of the modern-day elements of the doctrine. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth the legal 
implications of impracticability as follows: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made 
impracticable without his[/her] fault by the occurrence of an event the 
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract 
was made, his[/her] duty to render that performance is discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.117 
This includes an analysis of whether “the existence of a specific thing is 
necessary for the performance of a duty” and its “destruction, or . . . 
deterioration . . . makes performance impracticable . . . .”118 
Section 2-615 of the UCC similarly provides that “except so far as a 
seller may have agreed [to] a greater obligation,” delivery delays or non-
deliveries will not constitute contractual breach by sellers if the 
“performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence 
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made.”119 Although the UCC by its literal terms 
only excuses “sellers” whose performance has become commercially 
impracticable, it applies to both buyers and sellers via the Official 
Comments and by analogy.120 Contractual obligations may also be avoided 
“[w]here the contract requires for its performance goods identified when 
the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without fault of either 
party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer.”121 Unless displaced by 
 
 117. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
 118. Id. § 263; see Brauer v. Hyman, 98 N.J.L. 743, 746 (1923). 
 119. The Official Comments indicate that section 2-615, not 2-614, is to be applied to force 
majeure situations. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977). 
 120. Id. § 2-615 cmt. 9. 
 121. Id. § 2-613. 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
1576 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1551 
the particular provisions of the UCC, the principles of common law and 
equity supplement its provisions.122 
1. Impossibility/Impracticability 
Modernly, exculpation from contractual liability may be warranted 
where a performance has become “impracticable” because of extreme 
and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the 
parties.123 “Impracticability” means more than mere “impracticality.”124 In 
other words, “[m]ere impracticality or unanticipated difficulty is not 
enough to excuse performance”125 unless this difficulty is “well beyond 
the normal range.”126 Similarly, under the UCC, “[i]ncreased cost alone 
does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some 
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the 
performance.”127 Even though the doctrine is sometimes phrased in terms 
of “impossibility,” it has long been recognized that it may operate to 
discharge a party’s duty even though the event has not made 
performance absolutely impossible.128 Further, “a party is expected to use 
reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to performance, and a 
performance is impracticable only if it is so in spite of such efforts.”129 
How much difficulty will render a finding that the performance has 
become impracticable? Increases in costs amounting to 33.3%, 100% and 
300% have been held to be insufficient.130 Mere market fluctuations and 
difficulties are also not enough. Ten to twelve times the usual cost 
hasin at least one casebeen deemed to suffice.131 Both Restatements 
state that a party assumes the risk of increased cost within a normal 
range, but might not assume the risk of “extreme and unreasonable 
difficulty.”132 “The UCC is more forgiving [and thus ‘only’ requires that 
the contingency] alters the essential nature of the performance.”133 In 
relatively few cases has the defense been founded solely on increased 
 
 122. Id. § 1-103(b). 
 123. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Empresa de Polimeros de Sines Sarl, 720 F. Supp. 312, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
 126. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981); Corbin, supra note 
40 § 74.7 (“Financial difficulties growing out of a general business slowdown or recession may cause 
personal inability to perform but do not usually constitute an excuse by impossibility of 
performance.”). 
 127. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977). 
 128. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.9(a). 
 131. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 291, 293 (1916). 
 132. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 454 (Am. Law Inst. 1932); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 133. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.9(a). 
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costs. “A large number of cases dealing with inflationary rises in cost 
have reiterated the traditional notion that increased costs alone do not 
give rise to the defense of impracticability.”134 
In a few jurisdictions, actual impossibility of performance may still 
be required for the defense to be available, at least in the weather 
context. In Louisiana, for example, a party can only prevail on an excuse 
when encountered by an “insurmountable obstacle that make[s] the 
performance actually impossible . . . regardless of any difficulty [the 
party] might experience in performing it.” Thus, for example, even “[t]he 
unexpected and unforeseen damage of Hurricane Katrina does not 
change the agreement between the[] parties; therefore, th[e] agreement 
[] can still be performed.”135 In Louisiana, “[t]he nonperformance of a 
contract is not excused by a fortuitous event where it may be carried into 
effect, although not in the manner contemplated by the obligor at the 
time the contract was entered into.”136 This was arguably a harsh result 
given the then-unexpected effects of Katrina. On the other hand, results 
such as this do signal to parties to fully prepare pragmatically, legally, 
and financially for even highly unexpected weather. In light of how 
volatile the global weather is becoming, this more traditional doctrinal 
outcome may once again be warranted. It would at least create clarity in 
contrast to the slippery slope that is impracticability. 
Even though requiring actual impossibility stands in contrast to the 
law in many, if not most, other jurisdictions, even the states that do so 
still require an analysis of whether a party acted “in good faith, 
responsibly, and in a timely fashion” when arguing impracticability or 
impossibility.137 No changes seem currently warranted in relation to the 
degree of difficulty required for a finding of impracticability. 
2. “Basic Assumption” of the Contract and Foreseeability 
For the defense to be granted, both the Restatement (Second) 
(“Restatement 2nd”) and the UCC require that the non-occurrence of 
the supervening event must have been a “basic assumption” on which 
both parties executed the contract.138 A party who assumed the risk of a 
certain event occurring cannot later claim impracticability. As an 
example of what may constitute a “basic assumption,” the Restatement 
2nd provides for the “destruction of a specific thing necessary for 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Associated Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Carbone Props. of Audubon, 962 So.2d 1102, 1107 (5th Cir. 
2007 (citations omitted)). 
 136. Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. v. Creston Hoop Co., 161 La. 1077, 1078–79, (La. 
1926). 
 137. Ziegler v. Pansano, No. 2008 CA1495, 2009 WL 1879355, at *6 (La. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
 138. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); U.C.C. § 2-615 (Am. Law 
Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977). 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
1578 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1551 
performance.”139 The UCC similarly provides that a contract “may be 
avoided where no-fault casualty to the sold goods result in a total loss.”140 
An issue in this context is whether foreseeability forms parts of the 
doctrine. At first blush, this does not seem to be the case; only a bare 
“basic assumption” analysis seems to be required. However, 
foreseeability is highly relevant under the UCC, the Restatement 2nd, 
and case law. For example, the Official Comments to the UCC note that 
commercial impracticality may arise because of “unforeseen supervening 
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting,” and refers to “unforeseen shutdown of major sources of 
supply or the like.”141 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) encompasses 
foreseeability by stating that “[i]f the supervening event was not 
reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, the party claiming 
discharge can hardly be expected to have provided against its 
occurrence.”142 In similarity with the UCC, the Restatement also 
mentions “unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply, or the like” 
as an example of an event that may constitute impracticability.”143 
Importantly, the Restatement also warns that “[t]he fact that the 
event was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not necessarily compel a 
conclusion that its non-occurrence was not a basic assumption.144 In other 
words, parties may not have contractually allocated the risk of a certain 
foreseeable event happening, but instead simply shared the basic 
assumption that it would not. Conversely, if a given risk was anticipated 
or expected, the performance obligation should, as a starting point, not 
be excused.145 Under this view, “if a risk was foreseeable, it is reasonable 
to assume that the parties contracted on that basis. That assumption, 
however, may not be warranted if the foreseeable event was nonetheless 
a contingency so improbable that reasonable parties may not have 
expressly or impliedly addressed in their agreement.”146 
 
 139. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 140. U.C.C. § 2-613 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977). 
 141. Id. § 2-615 cmt. 1. 
 142. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 143. Id. at cmt. d. 
 144. Id. at cmt. b. 
 145. See, e.g., Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)( 3); Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
 146. See, e.g., Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)( 3); Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
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A pure foreseeability analysis is thus  
an incomplete and sometimes misleading test. Anyone can foresee, in 
some general sense, a whole variety of potential calamities, but that does 
not mean that the or she will deem them worth bargaining over . . . The 
risk may be too remote, the party may not have sufficient bargaining 
power, or neither party may have any superior ability to avoid the harm . . . 
. Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its 
allocation. Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the 
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot 
agree, often because they are too busy. Moreover, that some abnormal risk 
was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily establish an 
allocation of the risk of the contingency which actually occurs.147 
That begs the question of what, exactly, may be said to be 
“unforeseeable.” One source defines an “unforeseeable” event as “an 
event so unlikely to occur that reasonable parties see no need explicitly 
to allocate the risk of its occurrence.”148 “Foreseeability” thus does not 
simply mean any “conceivable” event. If that were the case, anything 
could, in theory, be said to be “foreseeable.” Instead, a reasonability 
requirement is interjected into the analysis. The defense will thus be lost 
if a promisor should have provided for a contingency that was reasonably 
foreseeable.149 This is so because “[f]ailure to provide for the reasonably 
foreseeable contingency demonstrates that the promisor assumed the 
risk.”150 In the words of one court, “[w]hen a performance becomes 
impossible by reason of contingencies which should have been foreseen 
and provided against in the contract, the promisor is held answerable.” 
Accordingly, “a seasonable event, one which is likely to happen and 
which common prudence would provide for, is not such an extraordinary 
event as will constitute an act of God excusing nonperformance.”151 In 
short, “absolute unforeseeability of a condition is not a prerequisite to 
the defense of impracticability.”152 
From an early stage to today, the foreseeability aspect is important, 
but is not the only determinative question in the overall analysis of 
whether the contractual defense will be awarded by a court of law.153 
While perhaps the most important factor, it “is at best one fact to be 
considered in resolving first how likely the occurrence of the event in 
question was and, second whether its occurrence, based on past 
experience, was of such reasonable likelihood” that the obligor should 
 
 147. Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. The CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438–39 
(W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 148. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
 149. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1875 (2015); Fla. Power Corp. v. Tallahassee, 18 So. 2d 671, 
678 (1944). 
 150. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
 151. Fla. Power Corp., 18 So. 2d at 679 (Fla. 1944) (emphasis added). 
 152. Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 153. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
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have taken practical steps against it or expressly provided for non-
liability of the risk.154 It is also important to note that the foreseeability 
standard is not the same as the one applied in tort.155 
Notwithstanding the fact that foreseeability is only one of several 
elements to be analyzed, many, if not most, courts still adhere to the view 
that the supervening event must have been unforeseeable.156 In one 
government contracting case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the event 
at issue not only had to be listed in the force majeure clause, but be 
unforeseeable as well.157 In a case where the contract referenced both 
“acts of God” and “other unforeseen events or circumstances,” the court 
found that even just a power outage, although not an act of God, “still 
would constitute an unforeseen event or circumstance that would excuse 
performance” under the circumstances.158  
In Louisiana, home of many recent weather-related cases, an “act of 
God” is one that, at the time the contract was made, could not have been 
reasonably foreseen.159 For example, in a recent case, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court thus noted, “that it was difficult, if not impossible, to 
know prior to [Hurricane Katrina] what areas would and would not 
flood, due to the unforeseen and unprecedented extent of the flooding in 
the aftermath of [the storm].”160 Unforeseeability is required in New 
Jersey as well.161 In New York, “[t]he impossibility must be produced by 
an unanticipated event that could not be foreseen or guarded against in 
the contract.”162 But, since “[a]lmost any inclemency of weather causing 
property damage is an ‘act of God,’ the phrase has been limited to a 
disturbance of such unanticipated force and severity as would fairly 
preclude charging a party with responsibility occasioned by that party’s 
failure to guard against it.”163 
A recent case demonstrates just how closely courts continue to 
analyze foreseeability even though it is only one part of the overall 
 
 154. Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1102–03 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
 155. See generally Facto, 915 A.2d at 62 (discussing the application of the foreseeability standard in 
contract law). 
 156. Murray Jr., supra note 41, at § 113(C)(2); Corbin, supra note 40, § 74.19; Perillo, supra note 
37, at § 13.18. 
 157. United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 122–23 (1943). 
 158. Facto, 915 A.2d at 64.  
 159. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1875 (2015). 
 160. Dollar Thrifty Auto Group, Inc., Inc. v. Bohn-DC, L.L.C., 23 So. 3d 301, 305 (La. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 161. Facto, 915 A.2d at 63 (“When an unforeseen event affecting performance of a contract occurs, 
such a clause will be given a reasonable construction in light of the circumstances.”). 
 162. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 385 (N.Y. 1987); see Brooks-Callaway 
Co., 318 U.S. at 122–23; Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Empresa de Polimeros de Sines Sarl, 720 F. Supp. 312, 
318 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 163. NYCHA Coney Island Houses v. Ramos, 971 N.Y.S.2d 422, 431 (Civ. Ct. 2013). 
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analysis. In TGI Office Automation v. Nat’l Elec. Transit Corp., a 
warehouseman stored $770,000 worth of photocopiers in a low-lying 
warehouse in a marshy area of New Jersey.164 Close to the warehouse 
were several bodies of water such as tidal pools, creeks, the Hackensack 
River, and a tidal estuary.165 The warehouse parking lot and other areas 
immediately surrounding the warehouse frequently flooded as a result of 
“nor’easters,” hurricanes, and tidal surges.166 In spite of numerous 
warnings about oncoming Hurricane Sandy, the warehouseman took 
only a few precautions the morning of the onset of the storm, such as 
placing mattresses in front of the doors to the warehouse. The 
warehouseman considered the facts that the warehouse was built to 
applicable codes, passed yearly inspections, and that the actual 
warehouse floor had never flooded before to be more important than 
facts about the actual dangers to the warehouse due to its low 
elevation.167 The warehouse flooded, destroying the copiers.168 The 
copiers were not insured, so the defendant sought to become absolved of 
liability arguing that Hurricane Sandy was an act of God.169 
The court held that although Hurricane Sandy was undisputedly an 
act of God, the defendant was precluded from invoking the act of God 
defense because of the defendant’s own negligence.170 Although the case 
was one of warehousemen’s legal liabilities in particular, it is still highly 
illustrative of several broader points in the overlapping area of contract 
law as well. The court carefully analyzed the foreseeability aspect, calling 
the “primary” or “ultimate” inquiry in relation to the defense whether 
“the ‘occurrence of the natural phenomenon renders unavoidable the 
damages that resulted’ or whether ‘the storm condition could reasonably 
have been anticipated or foreseen and its consequences further 
prevented or avoided by human agency.’”171 The court demonstrated in 
no less than eighteen pages how well the hurricane had been forecast by 
entities such as the National Hurricane Center, the National Weather 
Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as well 
as local and national media.172 This demonstrates just how seriously some 
courts take the aspect of foreseeability. 
Part of this inquiry is, of course, also the affected party’s due 
diligence in avoiding the problem. Having found that this particular 
 
 164. TGI Office Automation v. Nat’l Elec. Transit Corp., No. 13-CV-3404, 5–6, 51 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
14, 2015) (Westlaw citation forthcoming). 
 165. Id. at 5–6. 
 166. Id. at 21. 
 167. Id. at 9. 
 168. Id. at 17. 
 169. Id. at 1, 17. 
 170. Id. at 34, 51. 
 171. Id. at 32. 
 172. Id. at 18–31. 
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defendant failed to take sufficient preliminary actions on hearing the 
weather forecasts, the court noted that “defendant cannot put its head in 
the sand and then scream [A]ct of God when a storm comes.”173 Further, 
that although defendant might not have needed to empty the entire 
warehouse days before the storm, conducting “’business as usual’ until 
mid-morning on Monday, well after storm surge flooding had become 
foreseeable, demonstrated an unreasonable obliviousness to (or 
dismissiveness of) the time, effort, and planning required to implement 
effective hurricane response strategies . . . . ‘[I]f you’re failing to plan, 
you’re planning to fail.’”174 Parties should be aware of the intensifying 
judicial scrutiny of not only what parties knew, but also what they should 
have known and done, about a certain weather-related issue. Failing to 
do so could, as this case and others show, result in legal outcomes that do 
not follow the traditional mold, even in cases of extreme weather such as 
this. This is even more so because this court, for example, emphasized 
that “[f]oreseeability may be determined by considering [weather] 
forecasts . . . media reports and other evidence introduced at trial.”175 
Courts also take the broader consequences of a finding of 
unforeseeability into account. For example, the closing of the Suez 
Canal, America’s entry into World War II, and OPEC price increases 
were all held to be reasonably foreseeable, arguably because of the tens 
of thousands of contracts that would have had to be dissolved or 
otherwise disrupted had those events been held to be unforeseeable (not 
to mention the fact that the events truly were foreseeable to parties 
following regular world news reports).176 Stability in both national and 
international contracting relations informs judicial holdings in this area.177 
Some authorities argue that risk allocation on the basis of 
foreseeability should be abandoned or at least modified.178 An effective 
method to accomplish this would be to allow a promisor to explain why 
there was no clause in the contract covering the contingencysuch as in 
the case of standard forms used by parties with superior bargaining 
power.179 Authority also exists for the proposition that even a “failure to 
deal with an improbable or insignificant contingency, even though 
foreseen, should not be deemed to amount to an assumption of the 
risk.”180 Under an “even more liberal” view, “foreseeability is of no 
 
 173. Id. at 45–46. 
 174. Id. at 47. 
 175. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
 176. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.18. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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importance when it is clear that the parties did not intend that the risk of 
the occurrence should be assumed by the promisor.”181 
Of course, parties often allocate the contractual risks expressly in 
force majeure clauses. In those cases, a requirement of unforeseeability is 
not imposed in order to enforce the parties’ negotiated agreements.182 
Thus, a recent Texas oil and gas leasing case found  
[t]hat the force majeure event be unforeseeable is not a prerequisite, 
however. Indeed, to imply an unforeseeability requirement into a force 
majeure clause would be unreasonable. This is so because in naming 
specific force majeure events in the clause the parties undoubtedly 
foresaw the possibility that they could occur, and that is why they 
enumerated them to begin with.183 
The crux of the matter is risk allocation. Contracting parties should 
be aware of the potentially extensive ramifications of a court applying a 
foreseeability analysis absent force majeure clauses. Many events are, in 
fact, reasonably foreseeable today. This is especially so when it comes to 
weather-related events. Recall that in one of the leading cases in this 
context, the court found that the Suez Canal crisis was foreseeable.184 
This finding was influenced by public policy. Public policy is greatly 
implicated in the context of climate change. Parties should be aware that 
courts may well, for that reason, and given today’s knowledge about the 
severity and frequency of “extreme” weather events, be more likely to 
find that such events were indeed reasonably foreseeable and that the 
parties thus contracted on the basis that the event might occur. The 
excuse will then not be available. 
While weather has always had the potential to cause problems for 
contracting parties, the issue is now one of increased frequency and 
severity. Where before, “extreme” events happened only occasionally, 
parties could more reasonably expect them not to occur. This is no longer 
the case; in fact, it is quite the opposite. It is now more reasonable to 
expect severe weather to affect a contractual performance in most 
geographical locales than to expect that it will not. As demonstrated by 
Superstorm Sandy, even major, modern urban areas such as New York 
City may be severely affected by the sheer forces of nature. In very few 
 
 181. Id.; In one leading case, for example, defendant sold real property to the plaintiff with a lease-
back provision. A tax benefit expected by both parties to accrue was very important to defendant. The 
IRS, however, issued a revenue ruling disallowing the tax advantage. Plaintiff argued that defendant 
should not be able to invoke the defense of frustration of purpose as it was foreseeable that the IRS might 
disapprove the tax benefits. The court, however, held that the defense was available despite the 
foreseeability aspect because it was clear that the parties intended that neither party should assume the 
risk. W. L.A. Inst. for Cancer Research. v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1966); see Krell v. Henry (1903), 
2 Eng. Rep. 754 (K.B.)  
 182. Kodiak 191 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Tex. App. 
1987). 
 183. Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 288 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 184. Am. Trading & Prod. Co. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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places can one reasonably expect to be separated from the potentially 
devastating effects of severe weather. 
Some ambiguity in the word “extreme” should, however, be 
recognized in the weather context. “Extreme” could mean both 
“exceeding the norm” or simply “severe,” in the sense that the weather 
event hampers normal human endeavors regardless of whether it is more 
commonplace than before. Under both interpretations, the outcome may 
be the same: Courts may find that the parties could have foreseen the 
events and thus should bear the risk of their occurrence, or disregard the 
foreseeability aspect and simply find that the parties must have operated 
under a basic assumption that the events might occur. 
The view that risk allocation on the basis of foreseeability should be 
abandoned or at least modified is sound when it comes to weather events 
and their effects on contractual performance. First, the fact that weather-
related events are very foreseeable today holds true not only in relation 
to their geographical occurrence, but also to their intensityweather 
events are now often more intense than ever beforefrequencythey 
occur more frequently than beforethe time of year of their 
occurrencethey occur both early and late during what was previously 
considered to be the relevant seasonsand the extent of their 
damagethink Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Parties bound to perform 
under almost any type of contract should foresee that “extreme” weather 
will simply not be considered to be so as often in the future as it has been 
in the past. Whether it is tornadoes and hail in Los Angeles, tsunamis in 
coastal areas, increasingly severe snowstorms in the Midwest and New 
England, or a range of what was previously considered to be “extreme” 
weather events, the previously “non-normal” has become or is becoming 
the new normal. Weather events may thus present a significant obstacle 
to a promised contractual exchange. 
Whereas contracting parties should, in general, be free to make 
certain assumptions in relation to their executory performances, reality 
demonstrates that it is becoming more and more unsound for parties to 
assume that weather will not play a role in their performances. It follows 
that courts would not be exceeding parties’ reasonable expectations by 
either excluding the issue of foreseeability from their impracticability 
analyses entirely, or by taking a much more skeptical view of what a 
reasonable party in the situation at hand should have expected given the 
availability of modern science, including meteorology, at the time of 
contract formation. Just as parties also cannot escape liability in tort or 
under statutory environmental law if the given event was “reasonably 
foreseeable,” the same should arguably be the case in modern contract 
law when it comes to weather events. 
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The problem with judicial holdings that continue to refer to whether 
parties, based on their “past experience,”185 should have practical or legal 
precautions against a potential weather calamity is that it becomes too 
easy to make the argument that, subjectively, the parties have not 
experienced anything of the relevant nature. The inquiry should not be a 
subjective one. Rather, the inquiry should always be an objective one, 
asking what reasonable parties in the given position and location must 
and should have assumed when contracting. This is not always the case 
today, but it should be. 
3. Causation and Control 
A party who is guilty of contributory fault is denied the contractual 
defense of impracticability.186 “The excusing event must not be within the 
‘reasonable control’ of the party asserting the excuse, that is, a party may 
not affirmatively cause the event that prevents his[/her] performance, nor 
may a party rely on an excusing event if he[/she] could have taken 
reasonable steps to avoid it.”187 Many force majeure clauses also 
incorporate specific language requiring that the supervening event be 
“beyond the control of” one or both of the parties. 
Section 2-615 of the UCC has, however, been found not to 
incorporate a “control” aspect per se.188 Unless parties explicitly agree that 
a certain event must, with no exceptions, have been “beyond the control” 
of either of the parties, courts may thus not be willing to impose a control 
requirement on force majeure clauses under the UCC. Any contractual 
stipulation narrowly ties the hands of the courts. Thus, where a force 
majeure clause stated that “either seller or buyer will be excused from 
performance [because of] circumstances . . . reasonably beyond its control 
or by . . . explosion,” the court excused the seller from performance in the 
case of an explosion even though this was not “beyond the reasonable 
control” of the seller.189  
In the context of severe weather events, the question becomes 
whether such events are truly just acts of God or nature, or whether they 
can be traced to humankind. As the law currently stands, that leads to a 
further analysis of the role the contracting parties played in this context 
 
 185. Opera Co. of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1102–03 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
 186. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.15; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. e (Am. 
Law Inst. 1981). 
 187. Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)(3). 
 188. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 919 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that in cases where 
courts have refused to excuse the nonperforming party because the problematic event was within its 
control, the reasonable control requirement was supplied by the terms of the contracts rather than the 
dictates of the law). 
 189. Id. at 18 n.1. 
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and whether they can be said to have been in realistic control of the 
problem. The human/nature dichotomy is thus highly relevant here. The 
“act of nature” (or “God”) notion is sometimes broadly referred to as a 
“natural occurrence over which humans have no control and were not 
involved in creating.”190 A leading contracts treatise also considers 
whether human beings have contributed to the event by noting that 
“[t]he kinds of impossibility that [excuse performance under a contract] 
in many instances are caused by human beings . . . .”191 Earlier courts 
considered acts of God to cover not just natural events such as storms 
but to comprehend “all misfortunes and accidents arising from inevitable 
necessity which human prudence could not foresee or prevent . . . .”192 
They found that the supervening event “must be the sole proximate 
cause of the nonperformance, without the participation of man, whether 
by active intervention or negligence or failure to act.”193 Even recently, 
some courts still look closely at human causation, at least as the defense 
relates to torts. For example, in the words of one: 
Any misadventure or casualty is said to be caused by the “Act of God” 
when it happens by the direct, immediate, and exclusive operation of 
the forces of nature, uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man 
and without human intervention. It must be of such character that it 
could not have been prevented or escaped from by any amount of 
foresight or prudence, or by the aid of any appliances which the 
situation of the party might reasonably require him to use.194 
Nowadays, however, courts analyze this element based on the action 
or inaction by the contracting parties specifically, rather than merely by 
“man” in general. Since “[a]lmost any inclemency of weather causing 
property damage is an ‘act of God,’” the phrase has been limited to “a 
disturbance of such unanticipated force and severity as would fairly 
preclude charging a party with responsibility occasioned by that party’s 
failure to guard against it in the protection of property committed to its 
custody.”195 In older contracts cases, courts also tied their analyses to the 
actions of the specific contracting parties and not, more broadly, man. 
For example, these courts found that “[t]o excuse nonperformance of a 
contract on the ground of an act of God, there must . . . be no admixture 
of negligence or want of diligence, judgment, or skill on the part of the 
promisor.”196 It is the party that seeks to rely on a force majeure clause to 
excuse performance who “bears the burden of proving that the event was 
 
 190. NYCHA Coney Island Houses v. Ramos, 971 N.Y.S.2d 59  (Civ. Ct. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 191. Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 192. Meyer Bros. Hay & Grain Co. v. Nat'l Malting Co., 11 A.2d 840, 841 (N.J. 1940). 
 193. Fla. Power Corp. v. Tallahassee, 18 So. 2d 671, 678 (1944) (emphasis added). 
 194. Butts v. City of S. Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). 
 195. NYCHA Coney Island Houses v. Ramos, 971 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (Civ. Ct. 2013). 
 196. Fla. Power Corp., 18 So. 2d at 678 (emphasis added). 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)  9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
August 2016]           RETHINKING CONTRACTUAL IMPRACTICABILITY 1587 
beyond its control and without its fault or negligence.”197 Newer cases, 
however, demonstrate how some courts continue to differentiate 
between what is considered “natural” and what is considered “human” 
even though as analyzed above, such differentiation has to a large extent 
become factually implausible in the weather context. For example, in a 
post-Hurricane Sandy case, the court stated that for a loss to be 
considered the result of an act of God, “human activities cannot have 
contributed to the loss in any degree” and that the losses must be caused 
exclusively by “natural events.”198 
When seeking exculpation from contractual liability, a party must also 
affirmatively demonstrate that the performance was impracticable despite 
the existence of reasonable diligence, skill, and good faith.199 Thus, “a party 
is expected to use reasonable efforts to surmount – obstacles to 
performance . . . and a performance is impracticable only if it is so in spite of 
such efforts.”200 A major treatise also urges that “if the promisor’s wrongful 
conduct was responsible for the [issue], the defense will be disallowed 
because of contributory fault.”201 
As can be seen, some overlap with the tort negligence doctrine 
exists. Thus, in a case where a contract stated both that a party could be 
liable for its own acts of negligence, but that it was not liable for acts of 
God, the court found that it was “called to examine the interplay 
between acts of God and negligence.”202 If a party’s negligence has 
caused the performance problem, courts are likely to hold that the 
contractual problem did in fact stem from a circumstance “within its 
reasonable control[,]”203 and would thus also not allow for the defense in 
contract law. For example, in a construction case where a particularly 
rainy spring had caused several project delays and disruptions, the court 
nonetheless concluded that the delays were within the control of the city 
and thus not the result of adverse weather conditions as the contracting 
city argued. The court stated: 
 
 197. Id.; see Entzel v. Moriz Sports & Marine, 841 N.W.2d 774, 778 (N.D. 2014) (quoting Black’s 
Law Dictionary) (“An express force majeure clause in a contract must be accompanied by proof that 
the failure to perform was proximately caused by a contingency and that, in spite of skill, diligence, 
and good faith on the promisor's part, performance remains impossible or unreasonably expensive.”); 
see also Corbin, supra note 40, § 74.16 (stating that contracting parties are under a duty to exercise 
reasonable diligence and effort, and should not be excused from liability if they have displayed willful 
or negligent conduct). 
 198. TGI Office Automation v. Nat’l Elec. Transit Corp., No. 13-CV-3404, 56, 33 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
14, 2015) (Westlaw citation forthcoming). 
 199. See, e.g., id. 
 200. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 201. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.15. 
 202. Garofoli v. Whiskey Island Partners Ltd., 25 N.E.3d 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 203. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 288 (Tex. App. 1998). 
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[W]e conclude that the delays were within the control of the City. The 
trial court specifically found that the delays and disruptions on the 
project were not the result of adverse weather conditions as the City 
insisted. Rather, the delays and disruptions were caused more by the 
City’s selection of a poor, unsuitable project site, with bad soil 
conditions than bad weather.204 
Similarly, where a contract clause exculpated a contractor from 
liability for “any damages for the project resulting from rain, flood, fires, 
earthquake, swelling of ground, hydrostatic pressure, or other acts of the 
elements, acts of other persons, government controls, acts of God, and 
non-issuance of permits[,]” the contractor proceeded with work in spite 
of inclement weather during an unusually rainy season after assuring the 
project purchasers that it would be safe to do so.205 The appellate court 
found that the trial court had misconstrued this exculpatory clause to 
exclude the contractor’s liability for its own negligence.206 The court 
emphasized that “[t]he law generally looks with disfavor on attempts to 
avoid liability or to secure exemption for one’s own negligence.”207 
Therefore, the concept of negligence is important in contracts as well as 
in tort cases. 
An alleged “act of God” or, conversely, negligence, may more 
correctly be seen as one of timing. For example, “one who contracts to 
supply water for irrigation knows that the purpose of the other party is to 
supply the deficiency in natural rainfall and that drought must be 
expected.” A failure to provide such water is then a “cause of [the 
party’s] non-performance, not the drought that was unusually severe.”208 
A failure to perform timely under circumstances that could be foreseen is 
arguably negligent and should thus also not be excused under contract 
law. By way of contrast, water compacts and other water agreements at 
the government scales have for a long time addressed the issue of 
drought well before the occurrence of the problem. Contracting parties 
should more accurately address the increasing risks posed by weather to 
their executory performances as well. 
The fact that there is overlap between the tort and contract 
applications of the doctrine is not surprising given its historical origins. 
Nor is this necessarily problematic. A given legal doctrine does not have 
to sound only in one area of the law or the other. At bottom, the 
“extreme weather” issue is one of proximate cause and traceability. 
 
 204. Lee Masonry, Inc. v. City of Franklin, No. M2008-02844-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1713137, 
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010). 
 205. Ungar v. Skinner Swim Pool Plastering, No. B196602, 2008 WL 1809689, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 23, 2008). 
 206. Id. at *6. 
 207. Id. at *5. 
 208. Corbin, supra note 40, § 1329. 
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Are severe weather events caused by humankind or do they simply 
remain purely “natural” events? And, what role should the answer to this 
question play in the contract law context, if any? First, readily available 
reports show that there can currently be little realistic doubt that “man” 
has caused or at least contributed very significantly to climate change. To 
be sure, drastic weather events have always occurred. However, science 
demonstrates that human beings have caused these to occur more 
frequently than ever before. Thus, the admixture of human action and 
the events causing contractual performance problems to which courts 
refer does exist. Nonetheless, the current judicial view is that the 
contractual defense will only fail if the problem is traceable to the 
particular party claiming impracticability. That is more problematic in 
the weather context since relating any particular climatic event to any 
particular contracting party is not yet feasible or realistic. As human 
beings, we all contribute to the problem, but the exact “slice of the pie” 
attributable to anyone in particular is simply not currently demonstrable. 
The proximate causation chain may thus be broken under both existing 
contract and tort law principles. 
At the same time, a more probing look into this aspect that also 
takes public policy concerns into account reveals that a finding that a 
party could not “control” the underlying issue may be said to depend on 
just who the contractual party claiming the defense is. Granted, if the 
party is a regular business actor conducting a run-of-the-mill business 
transaction, that party cannot reasonably be said to have been able to 
have had much of a chance to “control” the global climate, at least not to 
any yet discernible extent compared to the literally millions of other 
climate change contributors around the world. Climate change is, to be 
sure, a “super-wicked”209 problem with a large number of private and 
governmental parties contributing to the underlying problem, and much 
difficulty in pinpointing exactly who should do what to solve it. But what 
if the party invoking the defense is a government unit, such as a city, 
county, state, or part of a branch of the federal government?210 That 
would, arguably, change the situation. 
 
 209. Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld, and Steven Bernstein introduced the 
distinction between "wicked problems" and "super wicked problems" in their article, Overcoming The 
Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves To Ameliorate Global Climate 
Change, 45 Policy Sci. 123 (2012). 
 210. For examples of the force majeure doctrine analyzed in the context of contracts between 
government entities and private parties, see Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 
23, 27 (Ind. App. 2013); Roger Johnson Constr. Co. v. Bossier City, 330 So.2d 338 (Ct. App. La. 1976); 
Lee Masonry, Inc. v. City of Franklin, No. M2008-02844-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1713137 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 28, 2010). 
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a. Governmental Causation and Control 
Governments at various scales could, and should, from a public 
policy and precautionary point of view, have taken much more action 
against climate change than they have. In fact, government entities have 
had, and still have, a chance to curb the climate change problem via laws 
and regulations, although precious time is running out. However, they 
have to a very large extent failed to do so. For example, the United 
States only introduced a federal climate change action plan in 2013.211 In 
spite of the European Union having announced its support of broad and 
deep climate change action for years, the United States and China only 
in November 2014 announced their mutual interest in climate change and 
clean energy cooperation.212 More than twenty years after the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change took effect, few of 
the 196 signatories have taken any meaningful steps to mitigate climate 
change, although they have, as mentioned above, now finally recognized 
the need to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 or 2°C. Few 
states in the United States have enacted climate change legislation, 
although some action is now being taken at the local and regional levels 
such as by cities and states either individually or in cooperation with each 
other. 
Thus, if China or the United States were parties to a contract (in 
China, for example, many companies are government-owned), could the 
nation(s) be held responsible for severe weather partially caused by CO2 
emissions from government-owned or -supported power plants, and thus 
be unable to invoke impracticability? Arguably yes. For reasons of public 
policy, courts could and should hold that contracting government units 
may not use the impracticability defense in the case of weather calamities 
to the extent they have been able to before. This is because it makes little 
common sense for governments to, on the one hand, assert that they 
should escape contractual liability in a situation involving extreme 
weather events when they at the very same time are one of the biggest 
contributors to the problemexcessive carbon emissionsvia their 
inaction in curbing such emissions through regulatory means.  
At the end of the day, governments exist to actively govern for the 
benefit of all of society given all actual societal problems that arise on a 
 
 211. Exec. Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan (June 2013). 
 212. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Joint 
Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation, The White House: Office of the Press 
Sec’y (Nov. 11, 2014) (on file with author), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-
us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c. Although more legal and on-the-ground 
action by both the United States and China is necessary to reach a breakthrough in international 
negotiations, treaty history shows that as few as two or three parties may provide the “magic number” 
necessary to pave the way for broader agreements. See, e.g., Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations, supra note 
18. 
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variety of fronts, whether controversial or not, and whether initially 
difficult to address for technical or other reasons. One problem in this 
respect is that contracting governance entities are not coextensive with 
the legislatures that have failed to take appropriate regulatory action. 
Even if a successful argument was brought that the “actor” is the 
“government” in general, an argument will undoubtedly also be made 
that few emissions stem directly from government entities. Rather, they 
can be traced to companies. A counterargument to this would be easiest 
in a nation such as China, where many corporations are government-
owned or controlled. Again, the facts and logic in this area are difficult to 
dispute: governments could have regulated corporate activities earlier. 
Granted, the political will to do so was lacking. In the United States, it 
still may be. But, with enough information and effort from the 
government to the electorate, sufficient political will could arguably have 
been created in this nation as it was in others. 
Extending contractual liability for the failure to take action in this 
respect, from a narrow body comprised of only the contracting 
government entitysuch as a city purchasing or promising to undertake 
certain servicesto broader governance units such as cities, states, or 
branches of the federal government might well operate as impetus for 
corrective action at the legislative and regulatory levels. This is precisely 
what is needed today. The judiciary serves a valuable function in this 
context. Many legal practitioners and judges have noted over time that 
the law is adapting too slowly to the realities of modern life and that the 
general public is losing faith in the judiciary. For example, a recent 
Gallup Poll on governance shows that only fifty-three percent of 
Americans have a “great deal or fair amount” of trust in the judiciary.213 
Given this perception, courts could regain some faith in the context of 
contract law and impracticability. The risk to the judiciary of continuing 
to excuse governmental and even other entities from liability because 
they could not have “controlled” the underlying problem is, setting aside 
the issue of which actual government entity could have taken action, that 
such holdings increasingly appear to be a mere rubberstamping of the 
doctrinal elements involved; almost a case of letting the fox get away 
with stealing the chickens. Holding at least governments accountable for 
contractual liability in the impracticability context in spite of current 
precedent does require quite some judicial courage and new thinking, 
but time has come for that for the public policy reasons to which courts 
have also looked for a long time. In the words of one court: “an 
 
 213. Survey, Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%, Gallup 
(Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judicial-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx. 
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exculpatory contract is valid only if the public interest is not involved.”214 
It clearly is here. 
For the limited purpose of contractual liability, holding government 
units accountable may be a novel and controversial, but not extreme, 
step in order to help bring about the awareness of necessary governance 
action that is so urgently needed in relation to climate change. In France, 
for example, a court recently took the much more significant step of 
holding a mayor and his deputy mayor criminally accountableeven 
imposing jail timefor deliberately hiding the dangers of floods in a 
known flood prone area in order to prompt property development 
there.215 In Holland, a trial court recently ruled that the Dutch state must 
take more action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions than what had been 
planned.216 Thus, the state must reduce such emissions by at least twenty-
five percentthe lower limit of the twenty-five percent to forty percent 
norm for developed nations deemed necessary in climate science and 
international climate policyand not just seventeen percent under the 
state’s policy. The case is on appeal, but demonstrates some newfound 
judicial willingness to set aside otherwise established concepts such as the 
separation of powers and political question doctrines. This may well be 
the case in the United States as well, especially in less controversial 
contract law cases. 
Times are changing. It may well take some currently unusual legal 
steps to make on-the-ground actors and policymakers aware of the 
severe problems being caused around the world by climate change. Some 
judges are just beginning to take such steps. If society has to wait until 
each “slice of the pie” can be precisely allocated to each responsible 
actor, that may never happen or certainly not until it is too late to curb 
climate change. That is not the issue here. Here, the issue is whether 
contracting parties should be able to continue to find cover under the 
doctrine to the extent they have been able to in the past, when they have, 
in fact, “contributed” to it. 
b. Private Party Causation and Control 
The causation and control issue also arises in relation to sectoral 
players such as, in particular, corporations in the fossil fuel, 
transportation, meat production, concrete, and construction sectors, all 
of which have produced very significant carbon emissions over time and 
 
 214.  Ungar v. Skinner Swim Pool Plastering, No. B196602, 2008 WL 1809689 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 
23, 2008). 
 215. French Mayor Rene Marratier Jailed for Role in Deadly Flood, BBC News (Dec. 12, 2014), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30453552. 
 216. Urgenda Found. V. Netherlands, Hague District Court, June 24, 2015, HA ZA 13-1396, (Neth.). 
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thus certainly “contributed” to climate change.217 However, the challenge 
in claiming that such players have been in “control” of or caused the 
problem for purposes of contractual impracticability is that arguably the 
companies in these sectors merely acted as any other market players 
would have. They neither violated existing statutory lawas this is still 
very underdeveloped in most jurisdictions when it comes to climate 
changenor majority case law. These actors could and should for both 
societal reasons and reasons of corporate social responsibility consider 
voluntary steps to reduce their carbon emissions. Some are doing just 
that. However, corporations tend to act in their own self-interest, which 
is first and foremost to make money. That is understandable, as their 
mandates require them to do so. They thus often do not do what they 
arguably “should” do from society’s point of view just to do so. It is 
simply implausible to expect corporations to stop emitting carbon out of 
goodwill and concern for, in this case, the global environment. Instead, as 
the situation currently presents itself, what is needed in relation to these 
players is both clearer regulations and common law liability. 
This brings the issue full circle: without more legislation and 
regulations, it may be difficult for the judiciary to hold that individual 
businesseseven as members of highly polluting sectorscaused or 
could have controlled the extreme weather events underlying an 
impracticability defense. It is, however, worth examining this from a new 
angle. Prior courts did not have much reason to question the applicability 
of the doctrine to severe weather-related events; there simply was not 
much, if any, doubt that “man” had not caused such events. In the 
modern age, however, courts and contracting parties have much different 
knowledge at their disposal and should take that into consideration. 
Limiting the excuse may be warranted in situations today where this was 
not the case until recently. Reluctance in granting a contractual 
impracticability defense to certain sectors of the economy, such as those 
in the fossil fuel industries or certain government entities may, granted, 
still be a radical idea. However, as has also been widely recognized 
recently, major changes of our current thinking and behavior are 
urgently needed to solve the increasingly pressing and difficult problem 
of climate change. 
Some newer case law frames the issue as one of whether a party has 
undertaken a “wrongful act.”218 Under a broad, yet common sense, 
interpretation of this notion, the actors in sectors such as the fossil fuel, 
concrete, and construction sectors are, arguably, undertaking precisely 
 
 217. For examples of force majeure applied to energy sector companies, see Perlman v. Pioneer 
P’ship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990); Tejas Power Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 14-98-00346-CV, 
1999 WL 605550 (Tex. App. Aug. 12, 1999); Va. Power Energy Mktg. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d 397 
(Tex. App. 2009). 
 218. NYCHA Coney Island Houses v. Ramos, 971 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Civ. Ct. 2013). 
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such “wrongful acts” by continuing their extremely carbon-intensive 
activities in spite of modern knowledge of the detrimental effects of their 
actions. What makes matters worse is that many of these companies are 
reluctant to voluntarily take any sufficient, practical steps to assist in a 
potential technical solution that would allow them to continue their 
activities, but with a lesser impact on society. In fact, several have known 
about the dangers of their activities for years, but spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars in attempts to keep the general public uninformed 
about the matter.219 One study, for example, found that 140 foundations 
funneled $558 million to almost 100 climate denial organizations from 
2003 to 2010.220 The largest, most-consistent money fueling the climate 
denial movement are a number of well-funded conservative foundations 
built with so-called “dark money,” or concealed donations,221 aimed at 
hiding the true donorsclearly a sign of a culpable mindset. Thus, “[t]he 
climate change countermovement has had a real political and ecological 
impact on the failure of the world to act on global warming.”222 
In this area, an analogy can be drawn to the civil liability for which 
tobacco and asbestos companies were eventually held despite having also 
initially claimedoften falsely sothat they did not know of the 
ultimately catastrophic effects of their activities on human beings, or that 
they were merely market players producing a product for which there 
was a demand. Although the liability for those actions sounded in tort, 
there is, as mentioned, clear overlap between tort and contract law in 
relation to impracticability. Finding that some companieseven if only 
the major playersin certain sectors should no longer be able to invoke 
the impracticability doctrine under contract law principles to the same 
extent as before makes common sense and finds support in case 
precedent from the tort arena.223 One cannot both have one’s cake and 
 
 219. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Exxon Mobil and the G.O.P.: Fossil Fools, N.Y. Times (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/opinion/fossil-fools.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). Justin Gillis & John 
Schwartz, Deeper Ties to Corporate Cash for Doubtful Climate Researcher, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/ties-to-corporate-cashfor-climate-change-researcher-Wei-Hock-
Soon.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 220. Douglas Fischer, “Dark Money” Funds Climate Change Denial Effort, Scientific American, (Dec. 
23, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dark-money-funds-climate-change-denial-effort/ (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. For example, although asbestos litigation proved to be an often lengthy process that may not be 
ideal as an “ex post” method of regulating business liability, the use of that dangerous product was, after all, 
discontinued by 1980, and a total of fifty-four billion was paid to claimants by 2002. See, e.g., Paul D. 
Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Unattended Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 Rev. Litig. 583 
(2007). In the tobacco context, although plaintiffs may have to pursue their claims individually and not via 
class action lawsuits, millions of dollars have, however, been awarded to tobacco victims just as the Florida 
Supreme Court just ruled that punitive damages may be awarded as well. See, e.g., Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., No. SC13-139, 2016 WL 1065605 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2016); Engle M.D. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 
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eat it too. Historically some sectors have contributed significantly to the 
causation of the very same events for which they now often seek to 
exculpate themselves in contract cases. That simply does not follow 
logically and thus arguably should no longer find broad legal support. 
Common sense and the law often go hand in hand. It should here as well. 
Thus far, judges in the United States have not held that companies in 
sectors contributing heavily to climate change cannot also exculpate 
themselves from contractual liability based on extreme weather events. 
However, the day has come to question the ability of some companies in 
such sectors to rely fully on the doctrine in the context of weather problems. 
These industries may rely on the argument that they are simply meeting the 
demands of modern society as businesses in free markets do. 
However, the “business as usual” model is, and must be, questioned 
from numerous angles, including by the judiciary. As demonstrated 
above, courts have begun to do so.224 Science demonstrates that if we 
want to prevent dangerous climate change, fossil fuel-intensive activities 
must be severely limited, if not discontinued altogether. This may mean 
that companies in these sectors have to cease operations altogether or 
shift to other corporate activities. Currently, many companies see this as 
a threat to their very existence. A wiser view would be to focus not on 
protecting the status quo, but on how to develop alternative revenue 
streams before, one day, regulations mandate extensive changes anyway 
or market demands simply shift away from outdated fossil-fuel intensive 
products and services on their own.225 This has happened before and may 
happen again. For example, in addition to tobacco, market demand also 
shifted away from such previously lucrative industries as train 
transportation, typewriters, film, and even many recently invented, but 
already obsolete, electronics products. That times are changing is a plus, 
but only if society is willing to change too. With societal change comes 
 
So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006); What is the “Engle Progengy” Litigation?, Tobacco Control Legal Consortium 
(2015), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-engle-progeny-2015.pdf. 
 224. TGI Office Automation v. Nat’l Elec. Transit Corp., No. 13-CV-3404, 5–6, 47 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
14, 2015) (Westlaw citation forthcoming). 
 225. This trend is already underway. For example, traditional fossil fuel stocks are performing poorly 
with oil prices plummeting from ninety dollars a barrel in late 2014, to forty-five dollars a barrel in late 
2015. Heather Long, Dumping Fossil Fuels was Great Move for Rockefeller Brothers Fund, CNN Money 
(Oct. 26, 2015, 10:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/26/investing/fossil-fuel-divestment-rockefeller-
brothers-fund/ (last vistited Aug. 5, 2016). Investment organizations such as the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund, which founded its fortune based on oil revenues, are divesting from fossil fuels to a greater and 
greater extent. Id. Listen also to Asset Owners Disclosure Project, The Global Energy & Environmental 
Law Podcast (Sept. 21, 2015), http://theglobalenergyandenvironmentallaw.podbean.com/e/asset-owners-
disclosure-project/. Recently, there has been a rebound of green energy investments worldwide with a 
surge of seventeen percent to $270 billion in 2014. Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2015, 
Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Fin. (2015), 
http://fs-unep-centre.org/publications/global-trends-renewable-energy-investment- 2015 (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016). 
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judicial change. Such change is likely to come about in relation to 
contractual impracticability as well. Proactive companies may wish to 
heed the warning signs that are surfacing in this area in both the 
regulatory and common law liability contexts. 
Seen from society’s point of view in general, albeit not from the 
individual contracting parties’ positions, contractual impracticability is an 
area of the law in relation to which it may be fruitful,  to adhere to an 
analysis of whether humans, broadly seen, have been involved in creating 
the occurrence. Recall that this is how some courts previously viewed the 
issue. It does not follow to argue that a party should be allowed to escape 
contractual performance liability for so-called “acts of God” or “natural” 
calamities when these are precisely,and to a very large extent, caused by 
humankind including the party at issue. We are all contributing to 
climate change, even to just a slight extent.  
Rarely are “natural” forces exclusively so anymore. Even smaller 
human contributions add up to the problem. Courts dealing with contracts 
should take a harder look at the interface between human and natural 
causation in general. Continuing to hold that parties may not face potential 
contractual liability because of the very same events that we have all caused 
only further contributes to climate change as a tragedy-of-the-commons 
problem. At the end of the day, we are all at “fault” for climate change and 
may have to face at least some liability for this in one legal form or another. 
Careful contract drafting may, as will be analyzed below, alleviate this 
problem. Parties should no longer couch excusing impediments in terms of 
“acts of God” or “nature” if they want to include severe weather that may 
be partly human-caused. More accurate contract drafting is key. 
At a minimum, courts should carefully scrutinize whether parties have 
taken reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of the contractual 
performance problems. Under the Restatement (Second), “[a] commercial 
practice under which a party might be expected to insure or otherwise 
secure himself[/herself] against a risk also militates against shifting it to the 
other party.”226 Courts have thus found that, for example, “where drought or 
flood is claimed to be an act of God it shall not be excused where the same 
could have been reasonably anticipated and provided against.”227 Similarly,  
[Wh]ere a party, by his own contract, engages to do an act, it is deemed to 
be his[/her] own fault and folly, that he did not thereby expressly provide 
against contingencies, and exempt himself from liability in certain events; 
and in such case, therefore, that is, in the instance of an absolute and 
general contract, the performance is not excused by an inevitable accident 
or other contingency, although not foreseen by, or within the control of the 
party.228 
 
 226. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 227. Fla. Power Corp. v. Tallahassee, 18 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1944). 
 228. Miller v. Parker McCurley Props., L.L.C., 36 So. 3d 1234 (Miss. 2010). 
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There are several practical steps that prudent parties can take to 
guard against the negative impacts of extreme weather events on their 
performances. Insurance is highly relevant. Contracting parties increasingly 
are looking not only to weather insurance, but also new products such as 
“weather derivatives” and other types of “prediction markets” to mitigate 
the risk of greatly increased costs or losses, especially as “the evolution and 
proliferation of these products has made them more transparent, more 
broadly acceptable, and more accessible.”229 It is outside the scope of this 
Article to analyze the impacts of climate change on prediction markets or 
the insurance industry in depth. Suffice it to say that the insurance industry is 
facing and recognizing potentially tremendous risk under both first-party 
coverage (such as for personal and commercial property policies), business 
interruptions,and builders’ risks, but also under third-party theories such as 
for commercial general liability coverage, products liability, environmental 
liability, professional liability, and directors and officers (“D&O”) 
coverage.230 D&O coverage is particularly relevant to this discussion because 
some regulators have begun taking action on climate change disclosures just 
as shareholders may sue for the failure to sufficiently disclose a company’s 
climate change causing-activities. Thus, “[i]nsureds facing claims related to 
concealment, misrepresentation, and mismanagement of climate-change 
related risk may look for reimbursement of defense costs and 
indemnification provisions pursuant to D&O policies.”231 Shareholders are 
unlikely to continue to pay for insurance or liability for events which 
corporate officers could have foreseen and prevented.232 
The insurance industry recognizes that “[g]iven the challenges 
facing plaintiffs in climate change tort litigation, climate change risk 
disclosure issues may become the focal point of the plaintiffs’ bar’s 
efforts”233 in the future. The chairman of Lloyd’s of London thus stated 
that “climate change is the number one issue for the insurance 
market.”234 The leading global reinsurance company Swiss Re has 
similarly acknowledged that no less than eighty-five percent of insured 
 
 229. Meyers & Shreinkin, supra note 26, at 5. “Prediction marketsalso called ‘idea futures’ or 
‘information markets’are designed to aggregate information and produce predictions about future 
events: for example, a political candidate’s re-election, or a box-office take, or the probability that the 
Federal Reserve will increase interest rates at its next meeting. To elicit such predictions, contract 
payoffs are tied to unknown future ‘event outcomes.’ For example, a contract might pay $100 if 
George W. Bush is re-elected in 2004, or nothing if he is not. Thus, until the outcome is decided, the 
trading price reflects the traders’ collective consensus about the expected value of the contract, which 
in this case would be proportional to the probability of Bush’s re-election.” Emile Servan-Schreiber et 
al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14–3 Elec. Mkts. 243, (Sept. 2004). 
 230. Christina M. Carroll et al., Climate Change and Insurance 135 (2012). 
 231. Id. at 138. 
 232. Asset Owners Disclosure Project, supra note 225. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Greg Munro, Insurance and Climate Change, Univ. Mont. Sch. L. Faculty J. Articles  
& Other Writings 27 (Summer 2010). 
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losses in the property casualty arena are “coming out of the 
atmosphere.”235 Thus, climate change will either be an “opportunity for 
the insurance industry or a threat to it.”236 Time will tell which it will be. 
But for contracting parties, insurance coverage is highly relevant. If 
insurance is available to cover a certain risk, parties are well advised to 
take out such insurance rather than merely relying on contractual 
provisions, thus arguably using a contractual partner as “insurance.” 
4. Risk Allocation 
Both the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
recognize the right of the parties to contractually allocate the risks in a 
way that differs from the risk allocation doctrines that would apply 
without such an agreement. This is so because the risk allocation 
principles of the Restatement (Second) are post-qualified by the phrase 
“unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”237 The 
UCC prequalifies its risk principles as follows: “Except so far as a seller 
may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding 
section on substituted performance . . . .”238  
Today, many of the theory’s “historic underpinnings have fallen by 
the wayside” with the result that force majeure is now “little more than a 
descriptive phrase without much inherent substance.239 Thus, what is of 
foremost importance to courts when considering an impracticability 
argument is exactly how the parties themselves have allocated the risk of 
the supervening event, if at all. Courts examine whether the parties have 
allocated the risk either explicitly or implicitly.240 Some courts apply the 
common law defense of impracticability even if parties have not 
addressed the issue expressly. One court recognized, for example, that in 
the absence of a force majeure clause, a power failure is the kind of 
unexpected occurrence that may relieve a party of the duty to perform if 
the availability of electricity is essential for satisfactory performance.241 
However, because many courts have held that the failure to cover a 
foreseeable risk in the contract deprives a party of the defense of 
impracticability, the best way to protect a client from this rule is to 
provide against foreseeable risks in the agreement with as much foresight 
 
 235. Id. at 29. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 238. Id. § 2–615 (Comment 8 indicates that in spite of the words “greater obligation,” the 
provisions of the section may both be enlarged upon or supplanted entirely). 
 239. Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 240. Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)(4). 
 241. Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(remanding the case to the district court to make findings of whether the possible forseeability of the 
power failure in the case was of such a degree of reasonable likelihood that the defense of 
impossibility of performance could be invoked). 
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and accuracy as possible. This is further so because courts consistently 
hold that 
[w]here the parties have defined the nature of force majeure in their 
agreement, that nature dictates the application, effect, and scope of 
force majeure with regard to that agreement and those parties, and 
reviewing courts are not at liberty to rewrite the contract or interpret it 
in a manner which the parties never intended.242 
Because of this well-known freedom of contract principle, courts 
very typically enforce the contracts as written. Elaborated one court: 
“Since impossibility and related doctrines are devices for shifting risk in 
accordance with the parties’ presumed intentions, . . . they have no place 
when the contract explicitly assigns a particular risk to one party or the 
other.”243 However, where parties do not allocate the risk with sufficient 
clarity, course of dealing, course of performance, or trade usage may also 
be used to identify the parties’ intent.244 
Courts are at liberty to, and indeed must, solve the exculpation issue 
where the contract is not as descriptive of a particular problem as could 
have been the case. The cases analyzed for purposes of this Article 
demonstrate that this is surprisingly often the case with respect to 
weather-related events. Accordingly, courts have some leeway to bring 
the doctrine into a greater degree of conformity with weather-related 
reality than what appears to be the case at first blush, given notions of 
freedom of contract. 
It is worth noting that at least some courts take a very narrow view 
when examining whether or not the parties intended a certain event to be 
covered by an express force majeure clause. For example, New York 
courts have held that non-performance based on a force majeure clause 
is excusable “only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the 
event that actually prevents a party’s performance.”245 This may be said 
to be a judicial oversimplification of the issue because, 
 
 242. Specialty Foods of Ind. Inc., 997 N.E.2d at 27; see Va. Power Energy Mktg. Inc. v. Apache 
Corp., 297 S.W. 3d 397, 398, 402 (Tex. App. 2009) (“The scope and effect of a ‘force majeure’ clause 
depends on the specific contract language, and not on any traditional definition of the term.” “Courts 
may not rewrite parties’ contract under the guise of interpretation.”); Entzel v. Moriz Sport  Marine, 
841 N.W.2d 774, 784 (N.D. 2014) (“To determine which party bears the risk of loss, we look to the 
provisions of the contract itself.”); “Force majeure clauses are to be interpreted in accord with their 
function, which is to relieve a party of liability when the parties' expectations are frustrated due to an 
event that is an extreme and unforeseeable occurrence, that was beyond the party's control and 
without its fault or negligence.” 30 Williston on Contracts § 77:31 (4th ed. 2009). 
 243. Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)(4). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987) (emphasis added). 
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[n]o matter how complete a force majeure clause may appear, an 
unlisted event may occur on which the promisor may base [his/]her claim 
for excusable nonperformance. After . . . September 11, 2001, major 
issues arose concerning the effectiveness of war exemption and other 
insurance clauses in the absence of an officially declared war and the 
necessity for new terrorism exemption clauses in insurance policies.246 
Contracting parties should thus be aware of the fact that drafting 
force majeure clauses is no longer a matter of simply classifying 
something as an “act of God” or “force majeure” and hoping that courts 
will give effect accordingly: 
That a party labels a condition or event a “force majeure” in a contract 
does not make that event a force majeure in the traditional sense of the 
term. Therefore, courts should not be diverted by this “red herring.” 
Instead, they should look to the language that the parties specifically 
bargained for in the contract to determine the parties’ intent 
concerning whether the event complained of excuses performance.247 
The latter may, however, be a circular argument in relation to 
weather events. This is so because the impracticability defense very often 
in actuality leads courts to analyze whether the parties could or should 
reasonably have foreseen the event regardless of the language used in the 
contract. As will be discussed further below, this is sound policy given 
not only current weather reality, but also bargaining power and adhesion 
contract issues. 
In spite of much foresight and careful contract drafting, doubt may 
arise to the exact nature and extent of the intended risk allocation. In 
that case, regular contract interpretation principles apply. Force majeure 
clauses will, like any other contractual provision, be construed in light of 
“the contractual terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of 
the contract . . . . When an unforeseen event affecting performance of a 
contract occurs, such a clause will be given a reasonable construction in light 
of the circumstances.”248 Similarly, the principle of ejusdem generis applies. 
Thus, for example, where “‘the event that prevents performance is not 
enumerated, but the clause contains an expansive catchall phrase in 
addition to specific events, the precept of ejusdem generis as a 
construction guide is appropriate’that is, ‘words constituting general 
language of excuse are not to be given the most expansive meaning 
possible, but are held to apply only to the same general kind or class as 
those specifically mentioned.’”249 In drafting contracts, it is thus “wise to 
follow the listing of specific items with a phrase such as ‘including but not 
limited to’ so as to preserve the general protection that would be 
 
 246. Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C )( 4). 
 247. Perlman v. Pioneer P’ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1251 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 248. Facto v. Pantagis, 390 N.J.Super 227, 232 (2007). 
 249. Team Mktg. US Corp. v. Power Pact, LLW, 41 A.D.3d 939, 942–43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(quoting Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts. 131 AD.2d 945, 950 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)  9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
August 2016]           RETHINKING CONTRACTUAL IMPRACTICABILITY 1601 
automatically afforded . . . without such a clause.”250 Some authority 
indicates that the rule of ejusdem generis may be avoided by using the 
phrase “including but not limited to” rather than simply “including.”251 
Further, when a general provision in a contract conflicts with a 
specific provision, the specific provision controls. Thus, in a case where a 
contract contained both a general force majeure clause (exculpating a 
marina from liability for damages for “acts of God or any other cause”) 
and an exception from that in cases of the promisor’s own negligence 
(“unless such damage or loss is directly caused by the negligent act or 
omission of the marina”), the court found that the more specifically 
worded exception determined the outcome.252 Importantly, many courts 
have, as analyzed above, concluded that exculpatory provisions that are 
phrased in general terms only excuse unforeseen events that make the 
performance impracticable.253 Thus, the foreseeability aspect is key in this 
respect as well. 
Some courts still classify an event as being an “act of God” without 
analyzing why this is the case. For example, where parties did not dispute 
that freezing weather was an act of God, the court simply held this to be 
the case without conducting any analysis.254 Superstorm Sandy has also 
been held to “unquestionably” be an “act of God”255 although scientists 
have cast serious doubt on this claim. Such conclusory judicial findings 
are, however, proving undesirable given the rapidly changing natural 
climate. More judicial scrutiny into whether an event truly can be said to 
be extreme and potentially unforeseen, or conversely, whether the 
parties cannot reasonably be said to have contracted on the basis of the 
assumption the subsequently complained-of event would not occur 
would arguably promote a more careful risk assessment and allocation. 
As is often the case, parties still frequently use anachronistic force 
majeure clauses with courts appearing to, at least in some instances, 
merely rubberstamp these as effective. This is inexpedient if the goal is to 
further a business climate that more closely takes the risk of severe 
weather events into account in the contracting stages. 
Even if courts find the weather event to be an “act of God,” this 
does not end the inquiry. Along with the other elements, negligence 
often forms part of either the common law argument, the contract, or 
both.256 Further, even though a certain event is not referred to as either 
 
 250. Murray Jr., supra note 41, § 113(C)( 4). 
 251. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.19. 
 252. Garofoli v. Whiskey Island Partners Ltd., 25 N.E.3d 400, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 253. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.19. 
 254. Tejas Power Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 14-98-00346-CV, 1999 WL 605550 at *8 (Aug. 
12, 1999). 
 255. Garofoli, 25 N.E.3d at 407. 
 256. See, e.g., id. 
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an “act of God” or force majeure by the court or the parties, it may still 
simply be considered to be the “event” that made the performance 
impracticable, no matter what it is called. For that reason, courts 
arguably do not have to determine whether the event was an act of God 
at all. They could simply consider it the “act” that caused the 
impracticability. 
Setting aside phraseology, the impracticability defense often 
requires extensive factual judicial analyses to determine whether the 
problematic event warrants the excuse. Recent cases illustrate just how 
fact-specific such analyses may be. For example, where rain delayed a 
construction project, one court meticulously analyzed the total level of 
precipitation causing the delay compared to the previous five-year totals 
and twenty-four year average. In doing so, it carefully scrutinized 
scientific testimony made by a National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”) expert.257 
In a construction case, extensions of time were expressly allowed by 
contract for construction delays caused by “adverse weather conditions 
not reasonably anticipated.”258 The contract also stated that the 
“contractor shall not allow reasonably foreseeable weather conditions to 
impede the progress of the work.”259 The contractor sought first an 
extension of time, and when that was denied, sought $266,828 in 
additional compensation for overtime work because of an alleged 
“unusually high level of precipitation” during two winter months.260 The 
court carefully analyzed data from NOAA showing that there were a 
total of nineteen days of measurable participation (twelve of which 
involved snow) during the thirty-six day period in question. The court 
noted that the total level of precipitation was 
13% below normal when compared to the previous five years, and 29% 
below normal compared to the past twenty-four-year average. 
Moreover, during the [relevant] time period, there were 13 rain days 
with a minimum of 0.1 inch of rainfall, compared to the average 12 rain 
days occurring during the past five years.261 
On this basis, the court found that the higher levels of precipitation 
for the relevant time period could have been reasonably anticipated by 
the contractor and noted that it “should have come as no surprise to [the 
contractor] that it rains and snows a good deal during the winter in 
northern Virginia.”262 Even assuming arguendo, that the rain and 
snowfall that winter were greater than the mean for the preceding 
 
 257. McDevitt & Street Co. v. Marriott Corp., 713 F. Supp. 906, 911–12 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 258. Id. at 913. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 910. 
 261. Id. at 912 (citation omitted).  
 262. Id. at 915. 
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twenty-year period, they were “far from the highest recorded and not so 
unusual as to have been beyond reasonable anticipation.”263 The 
contractor was thus not excused under the force majeure clause.264  This 
also demonstrates the specificity with which some courts will undertake 
the above-mentioned foreseeability analyses. 
In another construction case, the contract at issue stated that the 
contractor would not be charged with liquidated damages or any excess 
cost when the delay in completion was due to, among other things, 
“unforeseeable cause . . . including, but not restricted to, acts of God . . . 
and severe weather[.]”265 The contractor sought exculpation from 
performance liability based on “unusually wet weather conditions.”266 In 
rejecting the defense, the court found that during the entire eight month 
period at issue, there was only a “‘plus departure’ of 2.82 inches. The 
total normal rainfall for the period is 30.99 inches.”267 The court closely 
analyzed the following weather data from the National Weather Service, 
demonstrating the harder look modern courts are taking towards claims 
of unforeseeability and alleged acts of God: 
 
Table 1: Deviation from Rainfall Norms 
 





Jan. 4.04 5.65 +.85 
Feb. 3.71 1.52 -2.57 
Mar. 4.10 5.01 +.86 
Apr. 5.19 6.44 +1.87 
May 5.04 2.00 -2.79 
June 3.34 5.84 +2.50 
July 2.89 7.63 +3.88 
Aug. 2.68 0.77 1.78 
Total 30.99 29.21 +2.82 
 
An expectation and analysis of clarity in contract drafting also 
pertains in Louisiana. Thus, where a contract specifically referred to 
“abnormal weather” but did not define it, the court found that mere 
“adverse” weather in the form of rain causing flooding after Tropical 
 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Roger Johnson Constr. Co. v. Bossier City, 330 So. 2d 338, 340 (Ct. App. La. 1976). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 341. 
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Storm Allison did not amount to an “abnormal” weather condition.268 
Courts look very carefully not only at any applicable force majeure 
clause, but also for example, at what are deemed to be “normal” or 
“average” and “extreme” weather patterns in any given geographical 
locale at the time of year in question. It stands to reason that some 
natural occurrences are quite foreseeable and even expected in certain 
areas. “Thus, hurricanes in Florida would not constitute a sufficient 
implied cause for impracticability of performance in Florida, though they 
may be sufficient in Nebraska.”269 
Of course, courts analyze all contractual provisions carefully, and 
not just those pertaining to weather. Thus, where a contract stated that 
“[n]either party shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Force 
Majeure to the extent performance is affected by . . . the loss or failure of 
Seller’s gas supply or depletion of reserves,” a very fact-specific inquiry 
into what constituted a “gas supply” followed.270 Contractual accuracy is 
always important, but perhaps especially so in relation to severe weather. 
The more specific parties can be when allocating weather risks to 
contractual performances, the more likely it is that they can accurately 
control the outcome of potential litigation without courts resorting to 
gap-filling or other contract interpretation methods. Parties should 
undertake a realistic risk evaluation at the contract drafting stage and 
specify exactly under which conditions who should be able to escape 
which promised performance(s), if any. Instead of merely making use of 
the boilerplate phrase “act of God” or even “extreme weather events” as 
currently is often the case, parties should specify exactly what is meant by 
such phrases. For example, do potentially liability-exculpating events 
include earthquakes or tornadoes in areas where these have not so far 
been common? Do they include hurricanes or storm surges above, but 
not below, a certain level? How about snowstorms that continue for a 
certain length of time or that happen at what was previously unusual 
times of the year? Droughts that exceed certain levels, time periods, or 
that occur in traditionally more rain-prone areas? 
Although courts in general are not free to interpret contracts against 
the parties’ intent, they may gap-fill as needed. Courts will not treat 
contractual clauses as dispositive without examining the circumstances of 
the case in order to ensure the creation of intended and equitable 
outcomes. This, for example, also holds true for various other standard 
contractual clauses, such as “time is of the essence” clauses, merger 
clauses and personal satisfaction clauses. However, specificity of contract 
 
 268. Hartec Corp. v. GSE Assocs., 91 So. 3d 375 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 269. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys. v. S. Fla. Transp., No. 04-CV-0751-CVE-SAJ, 2005 Dist. LEXIS 
38489, at *13–14 (N.D. Okla. 2005). 
 270. Va. Power Energy Mktg. Inc. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W. 3d 397, 403 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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drafting will be key to ensuring as much predictability and certainty of 
judicial outcomes as is possible in this particular area. Parties may also 
benefit from revisiting the provisions throughout the contractual 
performance, and adjusting the contract as necessary and feasible271. This 
may be particularly relevant where the contractual performance runs 
over more than just a few months, as is the case of many power and 
warranty contracts. 
Under established principles of contract law, parties can, with few 
limits, determine their own “law of the contract.” Courts are not at 
liberty to construe contracts in a manner that goes against the clear 
intent of the parties. In the words of Judge Posner:  
[A]n essential function of contracts is to allocate risk, and would be 
defeated if courts treated the materializing of a bargained-over, 
allocated risk as a misfortune the burden of which is required to be 
shared between the parties . . . rather than borne entirely by the party 
to whom the risk has been allocated by mutual agreement.272  
 It is unlikely that courts will disturb this principle. They should not 
do so where parties explicitly and truly reached a mutual agreement 
upon a certain risk allocation. However, ifas often happensparties 
fail to bargain over and accurately allocate their risks, courts should 
examine the defense much more critically than before for reasons of 
contractual clarity and expectations as well as for public policy purposes. 
The doctrine was developed to encompass certain very unusual situations 
and should not be broadened beyond this. If anything, as previously 
mentioned, it should be narrowed. 
Where courts have sometimes appeared willing to more or less 
“rubberstamp” a weather event as an “act of God” or force majeure, this 
may become less and less likely to remain so. Contracts have, after all, 
also been recognized to serve as more than a mere risk allocation vehicle:  
[C]ontracts do not just allocate risk. They also . . . set in motion a 
cooperative enterprise, which may to some extent place one party at 
the other’s mercy. “The parties to a contract are embarked on a 
cooperative venture, and a minimum of cooperativeness in the event 
unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage is required even if 
not an explicit duty of the contract.”273 
To a large extent, the matter is one of the enforceability or 
limitation of contractual terms for reasons of public policy 
notwithstanding how parties have phrased them. Other contract clauses 
that were broadly held enforceable for a long time have modernly been 
held unenforceable for reasons of public policy. Non-compete clauses, 
for example, were traditionally considered a matter of purely private 
 
 271. Meyers & Shreinkin, supra note 26, at 2. 
 272. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 273. Id. 
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contracting without much scrutiny of their broader consequences for 
society. Whereas this is still the case in some states, other states have 
started to question the desirability of non-compete clauses seen from a 
broader societal point of view. The California Supreme Court, for 
example, has unanimously held that Business & Professions Code 
Section 16600, which states that “every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any 
kind is to that extent void” means, for reasons of public policy, that non-
compete clauses are invalid.274 “Indeed, no reported California state 
court decision has endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning [otherwise], 
and we are of the view that California courts have been clear in their 
expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the 
state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.”275 
Another example of the same tension is also apparent in arbitration 
clauses where the interface between the right to remedy one’s injury in 
court and contractual stipulations to the contrary is evident. In these and 
other cases, the law is “flipping” to better take employees and private 
individuals into account instead of merely relying on the express 
provisions of the contract. Similarly, in the case of force majeure clauses, 
courts should more closely scrutinize whether such clauses were freely 
bargained for or, as has been the case with many arbitration clauses, the 
result of more one-sided, uneven bargaining powers. They should also 
take a hard look from society’s point of view at the desirability of 
allowing contract parties to exculpate themselves from liability for events 
that have become an almost everyday occurrence. The costs of weather 
calamities must, simply, be better internalized by all societal players 
including contracting parties. 
The normative values of law including concerns of fairness and 
public policy are at issue with many contracts clauses and certainly 
among them force majeure clauses. As Judge Posner pointed out: 
Contract law should not protect opportunistic behavior when such 
behavior exceeds taking advantage of superior market knowledge and 
ventures into bad faith conduct.276 If, for example, one party has more 
knowledge about the potential implications of severe weather on a 
contractual performance, yet does not disclose this and perhaps even 
takes advantage of it, an issue of bad faith arises. So will the issue of 
whether the parties have truly “mutually” agreed upon the force majeure 
term to begin with. In short, simply because a contract contains a certain 
term, an analysis of potentially overshadowing issues is not precluded. 
 
 274. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008) (providing examples of non-
compete and other restrictive contract clauses that were held invalid). 
 275. Id. at 297. 
 276. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 941 F.2d at 595. 
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Merely concluding that parties are “sophisticated” and could have 
negotiated a term differently is another binary falsity that should be 
considered when analyzing force majeure terms. Some parties simply 
have more resources than others. Some negotiating and drafting 
attorneys are more sophisticated than others. The circumstances behind 
the drafting of the clauses should, in short, be taken into account by 
courts in the context of climate and beyond. The view that the 
contractual language binds is simply too narrow for reasons of 
contractual fairness. This has been widely recognized in the area of 
unconscionability, which is alive and well in many states. It should be in 
relation to the drafting and application of force majeure clauses as well. 
Where no force majeure clause is at issue, courts should apply a 
critical examination of the overall doctrine of impracticability and more 
sparsely allow for this defense in the case of severe weather events. This 
will send a signal to contracting parties that they should be prepared to 
internalize even arguably unexpected costs of impracticable events in 
their bargains. This could, for example, be accomplished via insurance 
coverage. On the one hand, such cost internalization may be passed on to 
clients and thus be unwelcome by many. On the other hand, a more 
careful risk evaluation and potential acceptance of the true costs of 
climate change by contracting parties and the business sector in general 
would force a higher awareness of the by-now established financial 
consequences of climate change at both the government, but also at the 
private levels. Impracticability is, granted, an established doctrine, even 
in relation to “extreme” weather. But importantly, it is one that 
originated under very different knowledge bases than are available now. 
 Courts serve not only a dispute-resolution function, but also an 
important signaling function. For the public policy justification of 
creating the broader awareness of climate change necessary in order to 
timely alleviate the problem or, as is unfortunately becoming more 
realistic, to prepare to adapt to climate change and the severe costs 
stemming from it, courts could and should be alert to the shift in 
realitiesscientific, economic and otherwisethat is happening in this 
area. Thus, courts should, for both contractual and public policy 
purposes, more carefully than before examine whether a given weather 
calamity conforms to the notions of impracticability for which the 
doctrine was developed. 
Time has come to discard legally and factually outdated phrases 
such as “acts of God” and “force majeure” in relation to severe weather 
events. Such events are to an increasing extent manmade. Thus, drafting 
parties should be prepared to allocate possible contractual risks much 
more accurately than before, avoiding such generic, anachronistic 
descriptions. Courts should also no longer discuss the excuse in such 
terms, but rather reference the modern impracticability doctrine in 
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general. By doing so, courts may reach the desired results without 
resorting to outmoded legal language that has arguably become an 
undesirable legal fiction. This and other broader concerns will be 
discussed in the following Part. 
V.  Broader Reasons for Change 
Above, I set forth some of the considerations that warrant taking a 
new, hard look at the closely related doctrines that support exculpation 
from contractual liability based on weather calamities. Broader reasons 
exist as well. 
Contracts may not be an area of the law that frequently changes, but 
it does also change over time as it should. The doctrine of 
impracticability has already changed much over time. Where at its very 
early stages, it only covered deaths or unavoidable illness in personal 
services contracts and supervening changes of the law that made 
performances unlawful and thus legally impossible,277 the doctrine now 
covers many more circumstances. Similarly, where actual “impossibility” 
was once required, courts now grant the excuse where severe 
performance difficulties have arisen. Commercial risks are, with 
technological and other innovations, currently very different than those 
of even just a few decades ago. Courts should narrow the applications of 
the impracticability defense in the context of so-called “extreme” 
weather events. This would send a signal to contracting parties to 
conduct more careful risk evaluations beforeand with more time-
extensive contracts, duringtheir contractual performances. Crucially, 
narrowing the implications of the doctrine would act as an impetus for 
parties to draft force majeure clauses more carefully than ever before in 
order to avoid courts allocating the costs of delayed performances or 
non-performances in manners that the parties did not predict. It would 
also encourage parties to take further steps to prevent or overcome the 
negative effects of weather events rather than resorting to after-the-fact 
litigation. 
Although parties take precautions to avoid contractual performance 
difficulties, cases on this issue, of course, may nonetheless proceed to 
trial. In that case, parties should be prepared to propose jury instructions 
that adequately and accurately describe how the contract allocated the 
risk of weather events as well as what an “act of God” or force majeure is 
considered to be in the particular location in question. Jury members can 
neither be expected to have sufficient knowledge of climatic trends in 
general or if the impact of severe weather on the particular parties’ 
promised performances. Jury instructions should carefully match the 
contract at issue. This should be obvious, but is not always so. For 
 
 277. Perillo, supra note 37, § 13.1. 
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example, in one case, the jury was instructed that before an occurrence 
may constitute force majeure, certain workmen “must have exercised 
due diligence and taken all reasonable steps to avoid, remove and 
overcome the effect of ‘force majeure.’”278 However, because nothing in 
the contract “expressly obligated” the workmen to actually exercise due 
diligence in order to take steps to avoid the effects of force majeure, the 
court refused to impose such a duty on the party, emphasizing that the 
parties had “merely agreed that when certain specified acts occurred, any 
resulting delay or interruption . . . was not to ‘be counted against 
Lessee.’”279 
A deterrent to invoking impracticability in the context of weather-
related contractual problems could be achieved by the implementation of 
attorney’s fee-shifting provisions or statutes. Under the “American 
Rule,” each party bears its own attorney’s fees in litigation absent a 
statutory or contractual exception.280 If parties were required by law or by 
contract to bear the costs of a failed attempt to seek the excuse based on 
severe weather unless the contract was clear on the issue, they may be 
more likely to consider the potential impacts of severe weather on their 
contractual promises more carefully, and take further precautions against 
such problems at the drafting stage. As mentioned, clearer contractual 
stipulations are currently needed in relation to weather disasters. At a 
minimum, fee-shifting provisions may be more likely to settle any 
problems out of court; a desirable result from a judicial efficiency point 
of view. 
The question has been raised whether it matters who ultimately 
ends up being financially liable for contractual problems as long as the 
outcome is based on existing legal theory. To unsuspecting parties, this 
may very well matter. Whereas parties ought, of course, to conduct a 
careful risk evaluation before contracting, it is also true that some parties 
will necessarily find themselves at the weaker end of the negotiation 
spectrum and thus ultimately unable to reach a different risk allocation 
even if they have predicted the risks accurately. For example, just as 
courts hearing arbitration and unconscionability cases generally take the 
relative bargaining positions and sophistication of the parties into 
account, so it is relevant for courts to consider whether force majeure 
clauses should be given as much weight as is currently the case where the 
party seeking exculpation is that with the stronger bargaining power. 
Risk allocation in the weather context is not one of the issues to which 
contracting parties and thus courts have given much weight until now. As 
 
 278. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 279. Id. at 283. 
 280. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see also Ly v. 
Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000). 
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this situation is changing, weaker parties in the bargaining equation 
should be aware that this issue could turn out to be as financially 
important as other aspects of the bargain. In turn, courts should take a 
very close look at not only the language of the parties, but also whether 
both parties’ intent and expectations were, in fact, as freely bargained for 
as is often the presumption. 
Because of the already existing overlap between the applications of 
force majeure in tort and contract law, it makes sense for courts hearing 
contract cases to follow a recommendation by tors scholars, namely that 
a separate “act of God” or force majeure notion is not even needed at 
all. In tort, regular negligence analyses amply cover the problems caused 
by an alleged failure to take the potential for adverse effects of severe 
weather into account when parties interact with each other in ways that 
may result in legal liability. “The time has come to recognize the act of 
God defense for what it is: an anachronistic, mirror image of existing 
negligence principles. The defense no longer serves an independent 
useful purpose and should be subsumed into the duty issue of general 
negligence analysis.”281 In cases of alleged breaches of contract, the 
notion of negligence may thus not only overlap, but maybe even cover 
the disputed problem on a standalone basis. Where parties have not 
specifically allocated their risks, the interrelated notions of foreseeability 
and basic assumption of the risk will, when analyzing the matter in 
conjunction with negligence, cover the matter. Archaic phrases such as 
“act of God” and “force majeure” in the contractual weather context 
have proved to be insufficient without deeper analyses of who should, 
under the circumstances, bear the responsibility for the contractual 
mishap. 
Importantly, time may have come to borrow another concept from 
tort, namely the notion of relative liability similar to the tort system of 
comparative negligence. Historically, if a party contributed to the 
problem underlying tort liability in any way, that party would not be able 
to obtain damages (“pure contributory negligence”). Today, only four 
states and the District of Columbia apply that doctrine.282 Instead, the 
majority of states now examine the extent to which a party may have 
contributed to the problem and reduce the available damages 
 
 281. Binder, supra note 69, at 4; see Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3 comments (Am. Law Inst., 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1) (“[c]ases involving serious and unusual adverse natural events‘acts of 
God’essentially call for application of the factors that enter into an ordinary analysis of negligence. 
Accordingly . . . a separate instruction on act of God may not be necessary”); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of 
Torts (2000) (“Courts often speak of natural forces as if special rules are needed in those cases, 
but . . . the decisions comport with the general rules of negligence and proximate cause. It is thus entirely 
possible to drop terms like ‘act of God’ altogether”). 
 282. See, e.g., Gary L. Wickert, Automobile Insurance Subrogation in All 50 States, § 4.01[15] 
(2nd ed. 2014). 
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accordingly (“comparative negligence”). In contract law, courts could 
introduce the notion of “comparative risk allocation.” Instead of the 
current binary solution of either exculpating a party completely from 
contractual performance liability, or not at all, when parties have failed 
to expressly allocate their risks, courts could examine the extent to which 
that party should have foreseen the event at issue and taken appropriate 
precautions against it. On this basis, damages could also be allocated 
proportionally between the parties. This may lead to a more equitable 
risk allocation. 
In other words, just as tort litigants share negligence by judicial 
allocation, so could contracting parties be made to share the risk based 
on a modernized framework of relative, and thus not pure, risk 
allocation. To be sure, contract law is, in contrast to tort law, based on 
the observance of antecedent risk agreements. However, where parties 
have either not addressed the issue of risk with sufficient accuracy or not 
done so at all (in which case the common law doctrine of impracticability 
still applies), judges would not run afoul of the law of the contract or, 
arguably, established contract law principles by allocating the risk 
equitably under the circumstances. At bottom, this is because the 
doctrine of impracticability is precisely geared towards courts conducting 
an after-the-fact investigation into who should be responsible for 
financially unexpected outcomes. Nothing in existing contract law 
requires an all-or-nothing result such as is frequently the case today. 
Rather, the relevant analysis and actual outcomes should be shifted 
towards a more equitable risk sharing system, taking into consideration 
such factors as who was in the better position to have avoided the 
contractual problem in the first place, the relative bargaining powers of 
the parties, and, crucially, the principle of reasonable foreseeability given 
modern scientific knowledge of the causes and effects of extreme 
weather. 
Similarly, cases are often said to sound in either “tort law” or 
“contract law.” This may also be an overly restrictive binary framework 
that does not sufficiently reflect the complexity of today’s business 
situations. Instead of such “either/or” solutions, “both/and” solutions 
would better reflect the reality of modern contract law. This is especially 
so in relation to climatic problems where both parties may actually be at 
“fault” for not predicting or preventing the problem at issue, although to 
varying degrees. Although a new comparative risk allocation system may 
be seen to break with established contract law and tradition, modern 
reality warrants this.  
Just as tort law moved away from a system that was considered to 
no longer be efficient and equitable, so can and should contract law be 
modernized in relation to impracticability caused by extreme weather 
events. Society has now developed a much greater and more multi-
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faceted understanding of this issue than even just a few years ago. Both 
the judiciary and legal practitioners are struggling with the general 
public’s lack of faith in the the legal system’s ability to respond 
appropriately and quickly to some of today’s most pressing and urgent 
problems. As mentioned, only fifty-three percent of Americans have a 
“fair” or “great deal” of faith in the judiciary today. Climate change is an 
area where the judiciary has the chance to regain some relevance in 
relation to at least the contractual implications of one of the worst 
contemporary problems of modern society. For the general public to 
retain or regain its faith in the judicial system and the law in general, the 
law must reflect on-the-ground reality. The judiciary itself started 
questioning the modern-day applications of the doctrine to weather 
problems decades ago.283 For this and other reasons, the time has come to 
reconsider the impracticability doctrine as it relates to severe weather 
events. 
However, the greater question remains: who may and should 
ultimately be held responsible for climate change: Civil society actors 
who have created much of the underlying problem or governments 
failing to implement rules sufficiently curbing the problem? If 
governments are considered to be ultimately responsible, should litigants 
be able to implead government entities as third-party defendants in 
relation to claims of contractual liability for weather-related problems 
thus proximately caused by the government’s inaction? Alternatively, 
may litigants implead sectoral players such as those in the energy 
generation and fossil fuel extraction industries for their very significant 
role in the problem? This may not currently be legally feasible because of 
the difficulty of proving proximate causation by each individual 
corporation or government entity’s contribution to climate change; the 
so-called “slice of the pie.” The broader legal implications of this 
problem on other areas of the law such as civil procedure and evidence, 
however, are apparent. 
In this Article, I promote taking a new, hard look at contractual 
impracticability for contractual, equitable, and public policy reasons. The 
most important of the policy reasons is arguably the fact that climate 
change is recognized as a tragedy-of-the-commons type problem. 
Something must be done about it, but it is not yet clear who must do 
what. Many parties at many private and governance levels are 
responsible for the underlying pollution problem. Nations have very 
divergent technological, financial, and other resource-based capabilities 
for implementing action against climate change. Some nations are more 
motivated to do so than others. Meanwhile, the problem is rapidly 
getting worse. As insufficient action is being taken to curb the problem at 
 
 283. Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 241 N.Y.S.2d 134 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963). 
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the purely private level and, arguably, regulatory levels, action should be 
incentivized by all branches of the government including, to the extent 
possible, the judiciary. Granted, judicial action in this context will require 
some courage. However, the judiciary must respond to the realities of 
society at any given point in time. This is surely the case when it comes to 
something as relatively uncontroversial as the contractual aspects of 
climate change. 
Public policy arguments already play an important role in contract 
law cases and should continue to do so. Recall, for example, the general 
rule that parties cannot excuse themselves contractually from their own 
negligence. In a case where an applicable statute dictated that 
[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to 
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own . . . violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law,” the 
court noted that “an exculpatory contract is valid only if the public 
interest is not involved.”284  
 In the case of climate change, the public interest is precisely 
involved. In contrast, a Texas court found that where a contractual force 
majeure clause said nothing about requiring a party to “exercise due 
diligence and take all reasonable steps to avoid, remove and overcome 
the effects of ‘force majeure,’” instructing a jury to consider whether this 
had been done was erroneous.285 However, while the Texas court noted 
that “there is no need for us to provide further remedy by implying into 
every force majeure clause the requirement that [a party] exercise 
diligence to overcome the effects of force majeure once it occurs,” it also 
emphasized the fact that the public policy reasons weighing in favor of 
requiring diligent, reasonable conduct to avoid the effects of force 
majeure were, in that case, adequately addressed via other bodies of oil 
and gas law. Where no other body of law adequately addresses the issue 
of whether a contracting party has acted diligently and reasonably in 
relation to their performances given potentially problematic weather 
events, public policy warrants a result that ties the analysis closely to the 
concept of negligence given modern knowledge of weather patterns and 
risks. Some courts still hold, in an almost per se manner, that “[i]t would 
be against public policy to hold one liable for acts of God” and that 
“inclement weather[] [is] . . . ‘obviously outside of [a party’s] control[,]”286 
without analyzing whether the event at issue was truly an unforeseeable 
eventwhether considered an “act of God” or simply an 
impracticabilityand whether granting an excuse for contractual liability 
 
 284. Ungar v. Skinner Swim Pool Plastering, No. B196602, 2008 WL 1809689, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 23, 2008). 
 285. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 284 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 286. Krautsack v. Anderson, 861 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. 2006). 
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would support the underlying rationale for such holdings. Doing so is 
counter to public policy today. 
Taking the promoted hard look at the doctrine of impracticability as 
it relates to severe weather events begs the question of whether doing so 
would be considered a “political question” best left to be addressed by 
legislatures at various levels in various nations. Further, if courts take 
action in this context, would they violate the separation of powers 
doctrine? 
Both can be answered in the negative. First, the legislative branch is, 
of course, responsible for enacting the positive laws of the state. It can do 
so or refrain from doing so as regards climate change regulation as voters 
demand it to do. However, the change promoted in this Article relates 
much more narrowly to the common law of contract. The doctrine of 
impracticability in contract law is well established, but nonetheless can 
be interpreted and thus eventually changed as the judiciary finds 
appropriate in the absence of contrary legislation given how relevant 
societal norms and situations change. Courts always interpret existing 
lawincluding, of course, the common lawto determine what the law 
is at any given point in time. This principle of American law has been 
established for hundreds of years since the days of Marbury v. 
Madison.287 Such interpretation must necessarily take into consideration 
new situations and facts such as anthropogenic climate change. The 
common law has always evolved and continues to do so as well as it 
should. In today’s marked absence of positive law on climate change, 
courts can and indeed must address the effects of reality on the common 
law of contracts. Further, it is fair and frankly realistic to note that “[n]o 
democratic system exists with an absolute separation of powers or an 
absolute lack of separation of powers. Governmental powers and 
responsibilities intentionally overlap; they are too complex and 
interrelated to be neatly compartmentalized.”288 Judges are, within limits, 
at liberty to (re)interpret the doctrine of impracticability so long as they 
do not violate legislation on point. 
Reinterpreting the impracticability doctrine would also not violate 
the political question doctrine. This doctrine is invoked by the judiciary 
in four situations: (1) when there is a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards to decide the case on the merits; (2) when judicial 
intervention might show insufficient respect for other branches of 
government; (3) when the issue is otherwise best left to other branches of 
the government to resolve; or (4) when a judicial decision might threaten 
 
 287. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 288. Separation of PowersAn Overview, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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the integrity of the judicial branch.289 In other words, when courts believe 
that the issue properly belongs to the decisionmaking powers of elected 
government officials, they may refrain from ruling on the issue at all.290 
They have frequently done so in relation to climate change arguments 
made under, for example, private and public nuisance theories and the 
public trust theory. Such claims have also faltered on issues of separation 
of powers, causation, and the practicability of judicial relief. The issue 
addressed in this Article is, importantly, not a matter of citizen relief or 
of extending the common law of contracts to issues of regulatory action. 
Rather, it is simply a matter of developing already existing contract law 
principles while addressing harm to particular contracting parties caused 
by weather events. The solutions propounded in this Article are tied 
narrowly to existing contract law, although offering a new take on some 
of those aspects of law. Other much more “controversial” issues have 
been resolved by courts in recent decades: abortion rights, affirmative 
action, interracial marriage, and LGBT issues. Contract law is arguably 
much less controversial than these turned out to be in the United States. 
Its interface to climate change events can thus be judicially reviewed 
without violating the political question doctrine. 
Finally, seeing extreme weather events as “acts of God” is arguably 
an outmoded legal fiction; “[a]n assumption that something is true even 
though it may be untrue, made especially in judicial reasoning to alter 
how a legal rule operates”291 or “false factual suppositions that serve as 
the basis for judge-made legal rules.”292 They derive their legitimacy from 
their origins as ad hoc remedies forged to avoid overly harsh legal 
outcomes or unforeseen and undesirable situations. Recall that in 
contract law, this is precisely how the impracticability doctrine was 
originally applied, namely to excuse parties from liability to perform 
given certain unforeseen and uncontrollable events, even though the law 
otherwise would have required the contractual performance agreed 
upon. Courts still use legal fictions as a mechanism of reaching equitable 
results when this would not be possible via other venues. But, legal 
fictions should not be used to circumvent facts that can be addressed 
otherwise. They should not be extended beyond the plausible. And, they 
should not be allowed to work an injustice.293  
 
 289. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 290. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
 291. Act of God, supra note 94. 
 292. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 Geo. L.J. 1435 (2007) (giving examples of modern legal 
fictions such as corporate personhood, constructive eviction, considering adoptive parents to be the 
parents of their children, consent given by others on behalf of children and the mentally ill, and the 
reasonable person standard). 
 293. For example, even though the notion of the “corporate entity” protects much behavior, courts 
nonetheless “pierce the corporate veil” when it is warranted in order to avoid using a legal fiction to 
circumvent existing law. 
DELLINGER-67.6.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2016  4:30 PM 
1616 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1551 
Further, a “serious question”294 has been raised as to whether the 
often unarticulated rationales used by judges when applying legal fictions 
outweigh the general interest in judicial candor. It is outside the scope of 
this Article to go in depth with whether the “act of God” doctrine is for 
sure a legal fiction with respect to contractual problems caused by 
weather events. To the extent that it is, it becomes especially important 
to recall that whereas until recently, weather wasfor then-good 
reasonconsidered to be something beyond the control of man, much 
awareness of the falseness of this supposition has arisen. We are 
deceiving ourselves if we continue to disregard modern climate 
knowledge. Courts should certainly not do so given their role in creating 
equitable and rational results. Whether or not it is fair to exculpate a 
contracting party from performance liability given extreme weather 
under the circumstances will remain a fact-specific inquiry. However, it 
stands to reason that continuing to treat extreme weather events as “acts 
of God” or force majeure is becoming implausible without at least taking 
the extent to which man is now known to contribute to the problem, as 
well as the foreseeability of extreme weather, into full consideration. 
Said one court: 
This court has applied the traditional common law principle embodied in 
the tried if not tired phrase “act of God.” . . . Is it not time to relieve 
Nature of even the formal blame for many acts which now seem to be 
within the scope of man’s prowess? Perhaps the term “act of God” should 
be replaced by a concept which reflects the possibility of human causality 
as well as that of the Divine. In determining liability . . . what is more 
important than the identification or nomenclature of the unknown cause is 
the answer to the question of whether there was any intervention or 
foreseeability or control on the part of defendant. If there is a negative 
answer to this question, then the result simply must be damnum fatale, in 
that the damage to plaintiff’s goods must be borne by him and not by the 
[thus excused defendant].295 
Modernly, however, the answer to this question is positive: parties 
often have had a chance to foresee the problem and intervene. Some 
courts seem to rely on a contemporarily inappropriate and inexpedient 
extent on standard contract phrases and traditional holdings of contract 
law that, as demonstrated, have become or are rapidly becoming 
outdated. Because what used to be seen as unpredictable and 
uncontrollable weather events are now much less so, the contractual 
doctrine of impracticability should be reconsidered in relation to extreme 
weather. 
 
 294. Smith, supra note 292. 
 295. Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 241 N.Y.S.2d 134 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963).  
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Conclusion 
Anthropogenic climate change is rapidly blurring what used to be a 
factually and rationally supportable distinction between “natural” and 
“man-made” weather events. Severe weather events that were 
traditionally considered to be “extreme” and unpreventable “acts of 
God” can no longer be said to be so to nearly the same extent as before. 
It makes little legal or logical sense to attribute costly and otherwise 
detrimental weather events to “superior forces” or “God” to which we 
now know that wemankindhave contributed to a very large extent. 
Whereas such events may not be completely preventable by man, we 
now know that they are not completely unpreventable by mankind 
either. If the global community decided to take effective action against 
climate change, the dangerous track upon which we currently find 
ourselves could still be reversed, preventing many events with very costly 
consequences. 
In the meantime, everyoneincluding contracting partiesmust 
pay heed in order to better protect themselves both practically and 
legally from the realities of an increasingly volatile climate. The judiciary 
should reconsider the impracticability doctrine and potential contractual 
force majeure clauses in contract law as these concepts relate to weather. 
Even though the doctrine is well established, the law is never static and 
should not be. The common law must be reexamined and potentially 
changed when circumstances warrant it. This is such a time. Three 
aspects stand out in relation to impracticability based on extreme 
weather: prediction, preparedness, and risk allocation. 
First, contracting parties should assess the risks posed by climatic 
events more carefully than ever before. In today’s world, increasingly 
volatile weather is to be expected in most geographical locations as well 
as at different times of the year than before. Weather is becoming 
increasingly “extreme” both in relation to degree and level of 
unexpectedness. Parties should carefully negotiate, assess, and 
contractually allocate risks posed by severe weather events and not 
assume that such events will not affect their contracts. They may very 
well do so. 
Second, parties should become better prepared to take both legal 
and practical steps to protect themselves against potential negative 
effects of weather events on their contractual performances before these 
become reality. Such protections should consist of more closely 
preparing for the performance to be undertaken given the time of year 
and location of the executory promises and, in the case of contracting 
performances of longer durations, reevaluating the risk allocation during 
performances. Insurance is highly advisable, if available. If a climatic 
event happens, parties should of course take immediate steps to alleviate 
the negative impacts to the furthest extent possible. Contracting parties 
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are expected to exercise reasonable diligence, skill, and good faith in 
their interactions. These factors are more relevant in relation to the 
effects of extreme weather events on contractual performances than ever 
before. Gone are the days when parties could generally expect to be 
exculpated from liability simply because of an extreme weather event 
referenced (or not) in the contract. Instead, parties must now be 
prepared to much more precisely articulate what risks they anticipated 
ahead of their performances than before and, if the risks turn into reality, 
what they did to avoid negative outcomes. This is sound, modern judicial 
interpretation of the common law applied to new situations and facts. 
Parties should expect closer scrutiny of their weather-related arguments 
in the future. Parties may also wish to consider pricing issues in response 
to potentially having to internalize the costs of weather events on their 
performances to a larger extent than before. 
In turn, the judiciary should more closely scrutinize arguments that 
parties did not actually foresee or could not reasonably have foreseen the 
problematic weather event. Exculpating a party from contractual liability 
based on the argument that the party assumed a certain supervening 
event would not become reality is troublesome from both a legal and a 
public policy point of view. At bottom, impracticability arguments on the 
basis of weather problems are becoming increasingly implausible. Parties 
should thus exercise more caution in this respect than in even recent 
decades. The law is likely to change. 
Third, the time has come to reconsider the current risk allocation 
framework. Instead of the existing binary approach, a comparative risk 
allocation system could be devised similarly to how tort law moved away 
from contributory, towards comparative, negligence in almost all states. 
It may in many cases be more equitable to require parties to share the 
financial problems caused by the effects of severe weather events. This is 
especially so in cases of significant disparities in sophistication and 
bargaining powers. In today’s market place and economic climate, with a 
seemingly ever-increasing amount of large corporations seemingly 
weighing more and more heavily on the scale of market force, the 
traditional argument that parties have freely allocated their risks as each 
saw economically fit may not be factually supportable. The risk of one 
party strong-arming the other party into accepting a certain risk 
allocation that favors the more sophisticated party exists in this context 
as well as in others. The market may have traditionally accepted this 
situation, but for equitable and policy reasons, the judiciary may also 
take a harder look at this aspect of the doctrine than before. 
Of course, where parties have allocated their risks fairly and 
precisely in antecedent agreements, these will typically be upheld 
because of the principle that courts will not rewrite the parties’ contract. 
However, preciseness in risk prediction and allocation is currently often 
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not the order of the day. In such cases, courts have more freedom to 
allocate the risk in a more equitable, shared manner. Introducing a 
comparative risk allocation scheme would very likely have the additional 
advantage of increasing awareness not only by contracting parties, but 
also broader segments of society of the severe financial risks that climatic 
events are known to pose. Such a scheme might thus function as an 
additional driver for a more effective solution to climate change at the 
legislative and other governance levels where action arguably should be 
taken. 
The use of such phrases as “act of God” or “force majeure” in 
boilerplate or closely drafted agreements is not and should not be 
dispositive. The crux of the matter is whether the event causing the 
alleged impracticability should have been reasonably foreseen and, at 
bottom, whether the parties were reasonable in assuming that the event 
would not occur. The issue may, in fact, not be the problematic weather 
event itself, but rather, the fact that the parties failed to take sufficient 
precautions against the potential negative consequences of it in hopes 
that the event would not take place. Failing to take such precautions 
against severe weather has become highly risky. Thus, courts should 
analyze causation and prevention more so in relation to the actor seeking 
the defense, rather than the nature of the event itself. 
When it comes to impracticability as an excuse for contractual 
performances, not just one, but several notions of law collide. The matter 
is not just one of freedom of contract. It is also a matter of concerns of 
fairness and broader public policy considerations. For example, whether 
it is desirable to enforce certain contractual clauses in light of the way 
society is coming to view issues such as the effects of humans on the 
environment, as well as how natureincluding more volatile weather 
situationswill save financial and other tolls on us. The common law of 
contracts often develops based on public policy reasons. Time has come 
to consider impracticability relating to extreme whether from that angle 
as well. What was the law for a long time should not necessarily remain 
judicially untouched simply because it is established law unless, of 
course, it is also still good law. With regards to the interface between 
weather problems and contract law, currently established law is not good 
law. It is becoming archaic and does not match on-the-ground reality. 
Like clouds clearing after a storm, knowledge about most natural 
events is now clear: climate change is to a very large extent anthropogenic. 
With climate change comes more frequent and more severe weather events. 
Hopefully, regulatory and other action will be taken to stem the underlying 
substantive problem in a timely fashion. In the meantime, severe weather 
events have vast financial implications for private parties and government 
entities alike. Thus, the time has come to rethink the doctrine of 
impracticability in contract law in relation to weather-related problems. 
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